NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6 by Jean Tirole
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6
Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer,
editors
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-02335-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan91-1
Conference Date: March 8-9, 1991
Publication Date: January 1991
Chapter Title: Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics
of Transition
Chapter Author: Jean Tirole
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10984
Chapter pages in book: (p. 221 - 268)Jean  Tirole 
MIT 
Privatization  in  Eastern  Europe: 
Incentives  and  the  Economics  of 
Transition* 
1. Introduction 
The transfer of most  state industrial  property into private ownership  is 
likely to be the most  difficult element  of the large-scale institutional  and 
policy  reform in Eastern Europe (EE). Although  there have been  recent 
privatization  programs in several other countries,'  most lessons  of these 
experiments  cannot  be  directly  transposed  to  the  specific  EE environ- 
ment.  Economists  must thus start from first principles to find techniques 
of privatization  that will perform decently  in this environment.  The goal 
of this paper is to discuss  how  incentives  and market structure consider- 
ations ought  to guide  the choice  of sequencing  and institutions. 
1.1 ASSUMPTIONS 
To circumscribe the task, we make the following  assumptions: 
First we  take it for granted  that the  long-run  target is some  form of 
capitalist  economy.  There  are several  variants  on  this  long-term  goal, 
with respect to the role of debt and equity, the involvement  of banks and 
*  This  paper  was prepared  for the NBER  Macroeconomics  Meetings,  March  8 and 9, 1991.  It 
has benefited  from  the access to several  recent  discussions  of privatization  (see references), 
in particular  Blanchard  et al. (1990)  and Hinds (1990). Accordingly,  the notes skip over 
several issues discussed in much detail in the literature,  and build on previous work by 
emphasizing  incentives and market  structure  issues. 
The author is grateful to the discussants and to Philippe Aghion, Olivier Blanchard, 
Mathias  Dewatripont, Stan Fischer, and especially Paul Joskow for helpful discussions, 
and to the Institute for Policy Reform  and the National Science Foundation  for financial 
support. 
1. E.g. in western Europe  (in particular  in the United  Kingdom)  and in Chile. Assessments 
of these experiments  can be found in Vickers  and Yarrow  (1988,  1990a)  and in a World 
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workers  in the control of the firms,  or the size of the safety net.2 While 
the final destination  is important over the long run, its choice belongs  to 
the realm of fine tuning  when  one confronts  the immense  difficulties for 
the  short  and  medium  run.  Unless  the  transition  path  has  permanent 
consequences  on the  governance  structures  (perhaps  for political econ- 
omy  reasons),  the  overwhelming  question  facing  EE is  less  the  exact 
target than whether  this target will be reached in reasonable time and at 
a bearable cost. 
Second,  we assume  that governments  will be able to start the privatiza- 
tion process  by renationalizing  industries,  i.e.,  that the government  will 
succeed  in  reclaiming  ownership  and  redistribute  it.  It is  a  common 
mistake  to presume  that EE economies  emerge  from central planning.3 
Most countries  have granted substantial independence  to firms and gov- 
ernments  will  need  to  regain  control  over  them  [Czechoslovakia  and 
(former) East Germany have recentralized control, but Hungary, Poland, 
and  Yugoslavia  have  not  yet  done  so].  The  initial  perception  of  the 
ownership  structure has been  somewhat  confused  with employees  run- 
ning  firms  and  pushing  their  claims  to  ownership.  This  situation  has 
several unfortunate  aspects.  A serious  short-run issue is that some man- 
agers, mostly members of the nomenklatura,  have engaged in "spontane- 
ous privatization" and stripped  some assets  of their firms through trans- 
fer pricing,  sweet  deals  with  foreigners,  and other plundering  devices. 
Governments,  e.g.,  in  Poland,  have  tried  to  halt  such  practices.  The 
long-term  concern  is that autonomy  has raised employees'  expectations 
over  their  receiving  ownership  of  their  firms.  However,  distributing 
shares  solely  to  the  firms'  employees  would  create inequities  between 
manufacturing  and nonmanufacturing  sector employees,  and across em- 
ployees  of  the  manufacturing  sector  (because  of the  substantial  differ- 
ences  in the productivity  of capital). Furthermore, employee  ownership 
may well reduce investment  and lead to decapitalization.4'5  While regain- 
2. In particular  western economies exhibit a wide variety of governance structures.  For 
instance, the German  codetermination  system involves employees  in the control  process 
more than American  institutions. The equity market  is more developed in the United 
States than in Germany  or in Japan.  Banks  by and large  do not own equity  in the United 
States (which have witnessed a substantial  decline of banker  control  of large corpora- 
tions in the twentieth century,  encouraged  in particular  by legislations  such as the Glass 
Steagall  Act requiring  the separation  of commercial  and investment banking). In con- 
trast, banks play a substantial role in controlling German and Japanese firms (see 
Narayanan,  1991,  for a recent  assessment). 
3. See Hinds (1990)  for a good discussion. 
4. See Bradley and Gelb (1982,1985),  Grosfeld (1990), and Lipton and Sachs (1990) for 
discussions of employee stock ownership. 
5. In principle, inefficient employee control over the firm may be avoided even if the 
government needs the employees' agreement  to renationalize.  It would suffice to com- 
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ing  control  over  the  firms  may  prove  difficult  in  some  countries,  this 
paper assumes  that this will happen,  and we  will not investigate  incen- 
tives if renationalization  turns out to be politically infeasible. 
Third, we  assume  for the  purpose  of the  discussion  that the  owner- 
ship claims will be distributed  freely to the population  rather than sold. 
While this assumption  is not crucial, one  can make a case that it is not 
unreasonable.  Selling  the shares in a nondiscriminatory  way would  cre- 
ate transactional  nightmares  (with  millions  of individuals  buying  thou- 
sands of firms). It would  require inexperienced  and uninformed  citizens 
to invest  substantial  amounts  of time  to assess  the  values  of firms (or 
holdings  of firms).  Last, it would  create substantial  inequities,  first, by 
favoring  informed  and  educated  citizens,  and,  second,  by  laundering 
the cash savings  of the members  of the nomenklatura  and the entrepre- 
neurs who  got rich during the communist  regime and during the uncer- 
tain period  following  its  fall.  For these  reasons,  giveaways  have  been 
recommended  in most proposals.6 
1.2 THE  OBJECTIVES  OF PRIVATIZATION 
We take it that capitalism is not wanted  for the sake of capitalism. Capital- 
ism is at best viewed  as an instrument  to achieve efficiency. It is important 
to identify  its crucial features  and to wonder  whether  these  are likely to 
prevail in the short- and medium-term  EE environment.  That is, will the 
incentives  of the firms' insiders (in particular, management)  and outsiders 
(shareholders,  creditors,  regulators)  function  well  in this environment? 
While efficiency will be the main concern of this paper, fairness is quite 
critical as well.  A major benefit of the current situation in EE is the initial 
equality of ownership  of physical assets.7 Surely, the policies to be put in 
they would obtain under employee ownership. However, such a lump-sum payment 
would prove prohibitively  expensive for the current  government. Because  the current 
administration  cannot  credibly  commit  to future  lump-sum  transfers,  one way of buying 
employees out of control is to grant them a minority  stake (e.g., 20%)  in their firms. 
What they lose in terms of share of profits, they may somewhat regain  through  higher 
profits  generated  by higher investment. 
6. See Borensztein and Kumar  (1990)  for a useful survey of some recent proposals and 
Fischer  (1991) for a good discussion of the sale vs. distribution  issue. The discussion 
above suggests giving shares of the firms  or of holding companies  to all citizens. We  will 
later discuss the option of allocating firms to a small number of individuals. Other 
methods that have been suggested include the free distribution  of some shares and the 
sale of some other shares, as well as holding back some shares for later sales when 
uncertainty  has been reduced. 
7. In principle, the assets belong to the State, that is, to all citizens; see, however, the 
previous  discussion on perceived  claims  to ownership.  There  are of course  also inequali- 
ties in human capital  and in monetary  holdings. We  will not discuss the reabsorption  of 
monetary  holdings (the so-called  overhang,  accumulated  mainly  by the nomenklatura)  in 
the context  of privatization,  as we favor  confiscation  through  macroeconomic  techniques. 224 *  TIROLE 
place to supply  the appropriate incentives  will create substantial income 
inequalities,  of  the  order  of  those  in  western  economies,  say.  But we 
would  find  it disappointing  if the  privatization  process  created wealth 
inequalities  beyond  those  that will naturally emerge  over time from in- 
come,  and  thus  savings  inequalities.  Besides  this normative  statement, 
positive  reasons  call for a "broad-based" privatization  policy. Excessive 
inequalities  combined  with  general economic  difficulties  and unrealistic 
expectations  concerning  the growth  of income  are likely either to fail to 
attract enough  political support or to create distrust in the new economic 
institutions  and might have grave consequences  in economically  and po- 
litically unstable  countries. 
Most  privatization  proposals  pay  only  lip  service  to our third objec- 
tive, the creation of an appropriate market structure. EE firms are highly 
horizontally  and  vertically  integrated.  As  a rough  approximation  most 
industries  are served by a national monopoly.  And previous input assur- 
ance concerns  have  led  most  firms to produce  their own  capital goods 
and other inputs,  such as maintenance,  repairs, and transportation. Free 
markets therefore  raise the two  concerns  of horizontal  collusion  and of 
vertical foreclosure of suppliers' and buyers' markets. Substantial restruc- 
turing will be needed  to create market structures that resemble  those  of 
western  economies  (where  anticompetitive  concerns  are  serious,  but 
pure monopolies  are rare and firms are much less vertically integrated). 
This form of competition-oriented  restructuring  (to contrast it with efficiency- 
oriented  restructuring, which  is meant  to improve  firm management  and 
discover  synergies  across  units)  will  not  be  voluntarily  undertaken  by 
the private sector as it reduces  profits.  Most proposals  dismiss  the issue 
by invoking,  first, trade liberalization and the emergence  of foreign com- 
petition,  and,  second,  antitrust  legislation.  While  both  policies  will be 
useful  ingredients  of a competition  policy, by themselves  they  are un- 
likely to be sufficient  to create appropriate market structures for reasons 
discussed  in Section  5. The creation of competitive  markets is thus  not 
an independent  appendix  to the privatization program. 
1.3 SCOPE  OF THE  ANALYSIS 
We will  follow  other  papers  on  privatization  by focusing  on  the major 
industrial  enterprises  (for instance,  in  Poland,  the  500 enterprises  ac- 
counting  for about  two-thirds  of industrial  production).  Smaller indus- 
trial enterprises  are widely  thought  of as being easier to privatize.  Simi- 
larly, the  privatization  of  agriculture  and  small  commerce  should  face 
smaller hurdles,  and furthermore  the problems  (for instance,  the chan- 
neling of credit to those  activities) are quite different from those attached Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  225 
to large industrial groups.  Last, this paper does  not address the start-up 
of private enterprises. 
While the analysis  will be conducted  in general terms and will not try 
to confront country  specific issues,  it is not meant to apply to the case of 
(former) East Germany, which  faces an environment  substantially differ- 
ent from that of the rest of EE. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION  OF THE  PAPER 
Sections  2 and  3 offer brief recaps  of some  essential  features  of private 
incentives  and government  intervention  in western  economies,  in order 
to later ask which  of these  features can carry over to the EE environment. 
Section  4 describes  the  institutional  and  sequencing  specificities  of the 
EE environment.  Section  5 draws  the general implications  of these  spe- 
cificities  and  thereby  defines  a minimal  set  of  desirable  properties  of 
privatization proposals.  Section 6 summarizes  the main conclusions.  Ap- 
pendix  1 describes  a  scenario  that  satisfies  the  above  properties  and 
Appendix  2 discusses  the  reasonableness  of its institutions  and incen- 
tives.  The purpose  of  these  two  appendices  is not  to formulate  policy 
recommendations,  but rather to clarify the discussion  of Section 5. Last, 
Appendix  3 compares  the situation of EE firms with that of growth firms 
in western  economies. 
2. The  Wheels  of Western  Economies:  Institutions  and 
Incentives 
Our economies  are extremely complex institutions.  It would be presump- 
tuous  to describe  them  in a few  pages.  But it is useful  to recall some  of 
their main features.8 
2.1 INSIDERS'  INCENTIVES 
The separation  of ownership  and control requires specific incentives  for 
the alignment  of managers'  and  shareholders'  interests.  Because of the 
large  scope  for waste,  much  attention  has  been  paid  to the  design  of 
managerial incentive  schemes.  Several imperfect mechanisms  combined 
together keep managers  under some  control. 
*Earning  based incentives. Managers  generally  receive bonuses  based  on 
accounting  data (income,  profit, output).  Bonuses  are more effective in 
fairly noiseless  environments,  as they  then  reflect managerial  inputs 
accurately. 
8. We include few theoretical  references in this section and the next. See, for instance, 
Holmstrom  and Tirole  (1989)  for some other references. 226 - TIROLE 
* Stock market monitoring. Accounting  data do not measure  increases  in 
the value  of assets  (and, if they react to investments,  they do so nega- 
tively  when  investments  are incurred).  Stock market analysts  acquire 
information  about  the  value  of  the  firms' assets,  and  the  stock price 
conveys  information  about  managerial  investments  beyond  that  re- 
vealed  by the realized  stream of future profits (because the stock price 
is an expectation  of future profits and therefore yields  a picture of the 
firm not yet  garbled by future  uncertainty).  Stock prices can be used 
explicitly  or implicitly  for managerial control. A substantial fraction of 
managerial  compensation  in large U.S.  corporations  is in the form of 
stocks and stock options.  Like bonuses,  stocks and stock options  work 
better if the  measure  is not  polluted  by large exogenous  uncertainty 
about the firm's cost and demand.  Stock prices can be used for manage- 
rial control  implicitly  as  well.  Indeed  the  managers  of large German 
and Japanese corporations  receive little stock based compensation  rela- 
tive to their U.S.  counterparts,  but the board of directors or banks may 
condition  the managers'  tenure  or discretion  on how  well  their firm's 
stock performs.  We come  back shortly  to the role of stock markets as 
most proposals  have advocated  their use in EE. 
* Relative performance  evaluation. The informational  value  of accounting 
and  stock  data  can  be  improved  by  comparing  the  performances  of 
managers  of firms facing similar environments.9  Relative performance 
evaluation  (also  called  yardstick  competition)  filters out  some  of  the 
noise  on managerial  performance  measures. 
* Board  of directors  monitoring. The firm's directors are meant to check on 
managers  and  have  fiduciary  duty  to shareholders.  There have  been 
doubts  about  their ability to intervene  other than by firing managers, 
about their incentives  and ability to obtain information about the firm, 
and about their independence  relative to management.10 Recent devel- 
opments  in the United States seem to have created more incentives  for 
supervision,  but boards  of directors are still very imperfect monitors. 
* Takeovers.  Takeovers have been  an important element  of the corporate 
picture  of  the  United  States  in  the  1980s.  Their  role  has  been  less 
important  both  historically  and  in  countries  such  as  Germany  and 
Japan.1 Takeovers are meant to discipline  managers by replacing them 
9. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find evidence that implicit compensation of U.S. chief 
executive officers (the revision in their pay and their probability  of remaining  in their 
position) is negatively and significantly  related  to industry  performance. 
10. See Mace (1971)  for a negative assessment of the activity  of boards  of directors. 
11. Hostile takeovers  are almost unheard  of in Japan.  In the United States, in 1986  (an all- 
time record), 40 of the 3300 takeover transactions  were hostile tender offers. It is 
difficult  to measure the indirect  effect of takeovers  on voluntary  transactions  (Jensen, 
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if they are incompetent  or else if they shirk (build empires,  etc.).  Man- 
agers may  care about retaining  their jobs because  they  derive  private 
benefits  from running  the firm or because  dismissal  imposes  humilia- 
tion and relocation  costs  and endangers  future job prospects.  Raiders 
are meant  to substitute  for boards of directors that either do not moni- 
tor the firm closely  or else collude  with top management.  The limits of 
takeovers are well known,  both in terms of managerial incentives  (they 
induce  managerial  myopia)  and in terms of the difficulty for raiders to 
prevent  free riding by current shareholders.12 
* Bankruptcy  and debt. Like the  threat of takeovers,  the  threat of bank- 
ruptcy  may  make  managers  worry  about  losing  control  or their job. 
Also,  in less  dramatic circumstances,  debt may still lower  the manag- 
ers'  discretion  by  preventing  them  from  using  retained  earnings  to 
finance  new  investments  and  forcing  them  to  go  back to the  capital 
market instead. 
* Labor  market  monitoring:  career  concerns.  Managers have reputations  and 
want to convince  the labor market that they are efficient.13 Outside  job 
offers usually  increase  their salary whether  they accept these  offers or 
stay  in  the  firm.  Career  concerns  thus  induce  managers  to  behave 
better. Such  concerns  are stronger  for young  managers,  although  top 
managers  may  still hope  for future  appointments  to boards  of direc- 
tors. They also are stronger for managers who  frequently interact with 
outsiders,  because  external  learning  about  managerial  talent  is what 
puts pressure  on the manager's  internal compensation. 
2.2 WHAT  DO STOCK  MARKETS  DO? 
The stock market is alleged  to fulfill several functions. 
* Risk sharing. A  risk-averse  entrepreneur  may  want  other  economic 
agents  to bear some  of the risk associated  with a risky project. Issuing 
stock is one  way  to do so.  The risk sharing explanation  for stock mar- 
kets,  however,  only  goes  so far, as there are other methods  to spread 
risk (e.g.,  through insurance  markets or through claims closely held by 
a well  diversified  financial institution). 
* Guiding investment. Another  well-known  motivation  for a stock market 
is  that the  firm's  and  the  aggregate  stock  prices  convey  information 
about  the  firm's  future  profitability  and  thus  help  select  the  right 
amount  of investment.  This motivation  is not very convincing.  Manag- 
ers are likely to possess  at least as much information about investment 
12. See Grossman  and  Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny  (1986) for discussions  of how 
free riding can be partly avoided. 
13. See Holmstrom  (1982). 228 *  TIROLE 
opportunities  as the firm's outsiders,  and when  one  further accounts 
for the  noise  in  the  stock  price,  it becomes  doubtful  that  managers 
would  learn  much  about  the  profitability  of  their  investment  from 
looking  at their firm's stock price. The informational  content  of aggre- 
gate stock indices  also seems  limited in an economy  where  agents  can 
learn  about  aggregate  activity  from  national  income  and  investment 
data, interest  rates, bond  prices,  etc. 
In our view,  the specificity  of the stock market is its role in collecting 
information  about firms and in acting on this information.14 This view 
underlies  much  of the analysis  in Section 5 and the Appendices. 
* Measurement  of the value of assets. We noted  earlier that it is difficult to 
measure  asset  value  and  to give  managers  explicit  or implicit  incen- 
tives to invest  in the absence  of a stock market. Stock market analysts 
collect  "speculative  information,"  that is,  information  that helps  pre- 
dict future  profits  of the  firm. This information  does  not  alter future 
profits,  but it helps  in measuring  managerial activity and is useful  for 
incentive  purposes. 
* Increase  in the value of assets. Stock market participants may also collect 
"strategic information,"  that is, information  that brings new  ideas  for 
management  (or about the desirability of removing  the existing one) or 
unveils  synergies  with  other firms. In other words,  strategic informa- 
tion is information  that, if acted on, increases the firm's value. It differs 
from speculative  information  also in that it is useless  to its proprietors 
unless  it is  acted  on  by  the  firm,  while  speculative  information  can 
benefit  its  proprietors  independently  of a change  in management  or 
control. 
2.3 INCENTIVES  OF STOCK  MARKET  PARTICIPANTS 
We just  argued  that  the  stock  market  supplies  information  that helps 
discipline  management  and increase  profit opportunities.  This informa- 
tion does  not come for free. Besides  the costs of transacting and those of 
regulating  the participants'  behavior,  stock markets make heavy  use  of 
highly  qualified  and well-paid  analysts.  Ultimately  these  costs  must be 
borne by the firms' owners.  The stock market institution  implies that the 
participants are rewarded  by trading shares.  (We would  warn the reader 
that  what  follows  is  a  very  orthodox  or  "rational" view  of  the  stock 
market. This view  seems  warranted because we will later argue for grad- 
ualism in the introduction  of such a market. It is therefore appropriate to 
build the best case for stock markets.) 
14. The following  discussion  and that of the next subsection  borrow from Holmstrom  and 
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The  major  obstacle  to  analysts'  taking  advantage  of  their  acquired 
information  is the  so-called  "no trade theorem": Rational traders, who 
are risk neutral  and  value  realized  profits  equally,  ought  not  to  trade 
simply  on  the  basis  of  differences  in  information.  In such  "zero-sum 
game" markets,  any  gain by one  is a loss  for the  other, and all traders 
cannot rationally expect to gain by trading. Hence trade should not occur 
if traders  can hold  on  to  their  share.  Another  version  of  this  extreme 
implication  of  the  "lemons"  problem  is  the  celebrated  free-rider prob- 
lem.  Suppose  that  a raider envisions  an improvement  in  the  way  the 
firm  is  operated  and  wants  to  take  over  the  firm  to  implement  this 
change.  To make money  the raider must buy at a price below  the firm's 
value after the improvement  is made.  Realizing this, current owners  are 
better off holding  on to their shares,  so that the raider may be unable to 
take over the firm. 
In practice,  we  observe  both  day-to-day  trading as well  as occasional 
takeovers.  Economic  theory  has suggested  explanations  for both.  Hold- 
ers of speculative  information  make money  because  of the existence  of 
liquidity  traders,  i.e.,  individuals  who  enter  the  stock  market  or exit 
when  buying  a house  or facing a medical emergency,  or institutions  that 
follow  rules  or  legal  requirements  for  diversification.  These  liquidity 
traders lose  money  on  average  over  their trades with  the  speculators. 
To  explain  the  acquisition  of  strategic  information  and  takeovers, 
theory  has  suggested  first,  that  the  raider can dilute  the  firm's assets 
somewhat,  and,  second,  that even  in the absence  of dilution big share- 
holders  have  an  incentive  to  search  for  strategic  information  because 
they  at least  enjoy  the increase  in value  of the  shares  they  hold  before 
the takeover  (or the proxy fight). 
Because we  will later discuss  ownership  structures, we ought to men- 
tion  the  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  the  stock 
market incentives  to acquire speculative  and strategic information.  Par- 
ticipants  have  many  incentives  to acquire information  about the firm's 
prospects  in a "liquid market," that is a market with dispersed,  liquidity 
traders.  (Note  that there is no presumption  that it is socially optimal to 
create liquidity by "offering liquidity traders as sacrifices." But this is an 
easy way  to create liquidity.) In contrast,  stock market participants have 
little incentive  to acquire speculative  information  when  facing large and 
stable owners.  On  the  other  hand,  concentrated  ownership  may  favor 
the acquisition  of strategic information,  as the raider derives more gains 
from bargaining  with  a single  owner,  say, than  from facing  dispersed, 
free-riding owners. 
It is important  to emphasize  the role of large participants in collecting 
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capitalism  with  direct  control  of  small  shareholders  over  firms  is  an 
illusion.  The  costs  of  obtaining  detailed  information  about  a  firm  or 
industry  vastly  exceed  the  gains  most  citizens  can expect  from it. Peo- 
ple's  capitalism  can  at  best  exist  through  large  institutions  (mutual 
funds,  pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  banks,  etc.)  holding  their 
savings  and being  given  adequate  incentives  to use them properly. 
Last, we should  note that acquisitions  also serve to allocate productive 
units  to  their best  use.  As  for any  economic  good,  wrong  prices  may 
induce  misallocation  of ownership  rights.  For instance,  a firm may take 
socially suboptimal  control of another firm if the former has information 
that the  latter is undervalued  by  the  market.  This adds  to the  general 
point that stock markets are likely to function better when  the firm is not 
subject to large exogenous  uncertainty. 
3. Some  Market  Structure  Issues  in Western  Economies 
3.1 MERGERS  AND DIVESTITURES 
It is  well  known  that  concentrated  ownership  in  an  industry  has  the 
potential  to  raise  consumer  prices  and  reduce  welfare.  And,  although 
the  net  effects  may  be  smaller,  vertical  integration  may  also  have  an- 
ticompetitive  implications  by foreclosing  access of buyers to suppliers  or 
of sellers to outlets.15 
There are two (complementary)  ways  of preventing  excessive  horizon- 
tal and vertical integration.  First, the antitrust statutes  often  require an 
acquirer to report a prospective  or actual merger to a merger commission 
who  can  then  challenge  it.16 Alternatively,  the  government  (or private 
parties)  can challenge  integrated  firms ex post  and  ask for divestiture. 
The evidence  is that it is easier  to prevent  mergers  than to break up 
firms.  Several cases  of divestitures  (such  as the AT&T 1984 settlement) 
have involved  long and costly processes.  [A current case of horizontal and 
vertical divestiture  is that of the British Electricity system (see Vickers and 
15. See, e.g., Hart  and Tirole  (1990). 
16. In the United States the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (1976)  requires  firms with assets or 
sales over $100 million to report all proposed acquisitions  of assets valued over $15 
million to the Department  of Justice  and the Federal  Trade  Commission.  These agen- 
cies, who share the mergers evaluation, must react within some period of time (30 
days, plus the possibility of a second request for information)  or let the merger be 
consummated  (see, e.g., Posner  and Easterbrook,  1981,  pp. 25-26, for details).  This  act 
reflects the philosophy of Section 7 of the 1914 Clayton Act according  to which mo- 
nopoly power must be thwarted  in its incipiency.  Similar  rules exist in other  countries. 
The European  Court  of Justice  enforces  articles  85 and 86 of the European  Community 
competition  law (concerning  restrictive  agreements  and abuse of a dominant  position) 
by making  agreements  that violate those articles  (such as anticompetitive  mergers)  null 
and void. Firms  must notify the European  Commission  to obtain  an exemption. Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  231 
Yarrow, 1990b). Interestingly  enough,  the break-up is taking place before 
privatization.]  Investigating  the asymmetry  between  ex ante and ex post 
government  intervention  into  market structures is outside  the scope  of 
this  paper.  Part of  the  asymmetry  may  result  from  the  merged  firms 
mixing  up  their  activities  to  make  future  break-ups  more  difficult. 
Whether  such  behaviors  have  taken  place  in  environments  lacking 
merger laws  is unknown  to us.  We take the asymmetry  for granted and 
point  at its  consequence  for EE: Any  privatization  before  competition- 
oriented  restructuring  is  likely  to  have  a long-term  impact  on  market 
structure in those industries  that are not obviously competitive and will be 
somewhat  protected  from foreign competition. 
3.2 REGULATION17 
Because regulation  or public ownership  is likely to prevail temporarily in 
some  industries  and  more  permanently  for natural  monopolies  (e.g., 
gas,  electricity,  postal  service,  railroads,  and  perhaps  telecommunica- 
tions),  it is worth  discussing  a few key features of regulation that will be 
relevant  in EE. We will not  review  here  the various  regimes  regulating 
pricing and incentives  (such as cost-of-service  regulation,  profit and cost 
sharing  schemes,  and  price  caps); we  content  ourselves  with  pointing 
out the general considerations  in the choice of power of regulatory incen- 
tive schemes.  The power  of an incentive  scheme  is the fraction of (mar- 
ginal)  cost  savings  or profit increases  retained  by the  firm. Regulation 
exhibits  a basic trade-off between  rent extraction and incentives.  Incen- 
tives for cost reduction  or innovation  are best provided by high-powered 
incentive  schemes,  in which  the  firm's compensation  is sensitive  to its 
performance  (an  extreme  example  of  such  a  scheme-the  fixed-price 
contract-has  the firm be paid a fixed amount  and be residual claimant 
for its cost savings  and profits).  High-powered  incentive  schemes,  how- 
ever, leave  substantial  rents to the regulated  firm. For instance,  under a 
fixed  price  contract,  any  exogenous  (technological)  decrease  in  costs 
goes  to the firm. Such rents  are economically  costly because  they  must 
be made  up by distortionary  taxation (if the government  subsidizes  the 
firm) or by  distortionary  prices  or premiums  charged  to consumers  (if 
the firm is required  to balance  its budget).  Furthermore,  popular  pres- 
sure  makes  it politically  difficult  to  sustain  such  rents.  Very uncertain 
environments  make  it more  difficult  to extract rents  and  therefore  re- 
quire  low-powered  incentive  schemes  (such  as  cost-plus  contracts  in 
procurement  or cost-of-service  regulation). 
17. This subsection  is based  on Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1989). 232 *  TIROLE 
The choice  of power  of regulatory  incentive  schemes  also impacts  on 
the  possibility  of  regulatory  capture.  Low-powered  incentive  schemes 
leave  little  discretion  to regulators;  for instance,  the  cost-plus  contract 
"reimburse  the  firm's  realized  cost"  does  not  make  much  use  of their 
information.  In contrast,  high-powered  schemes  require substantial use 
of the regulator's information  (for instance,  to locate the socially optimal 
price  to  be  paid  to  the  firm in  a  fixed-price  contract).  They  are thus 
subject to capture by interest  groups,  in particular the industry. There- 
fore countries  where  the threat of regulatory capture is particularly high 
should  adopt  low-powered  incentive  schemes  for their regulated  firms 
and public enterprises. 
4. The  Eastern  European  Environment 
To understand  how  incentive  structures must be tailored to the EE envi- 
ronment,  it is convenient  to describe its evolution  as an initial noisy phase 
followed  by a more mature  phase. This division  starkly highlights  the two 
key specificities  of the firm's environment  in these transition economies: 
the  extraordinarily  high  amount  of  uncertainty  not  controlled  by  the 
firms and  the  nonstationarity  in its level.  Needless  to say, the  various 
types  of  uncertainty  will  not  resolve  simultaneously,  and  the  division 
into two phases  is only an abstraction facilitating the analysis. 
The first years of the drive toward market economies  involve  consider- 
able economic,  legal,  and political uncertainty  for firms: 
* Cost uncertainty.  The prices of inputs  (labor, energy, raw materials, etc.) 
will be substantially  modified.  First, these  prices are heavily  distorted 
and will need  to move  toward yet unknown  market prices. Second,  the 
speed  at which  some  of these inputs will be available is itself uncertain. 
For example,  there  are currently  almost  no  accountants  and  lawyers 
trained to deal with modern  corporations.  Similarly it is hard to predict 
how  fast  entrepreneurial  culture  will  pick  up.  Third,  final  market 
prices  will  depend  on  yet  unknown  governmental  choices.  For in- 
stance,  the cost of labor will be influenced  by policies concerning  social 
security and unemployment  insurance. 
* Demand uncertainty. The demand  for a firm's products  will be unusu- 
ally random  in the years  to come.  It will depend  on highly  uncertain 
standards  of living  (themselves  linked to, e.g.,  macroeconomic  stabili- 
zation  plans,  lending  by foreign  countries,  foreign exchange  develop- 
ments,  and housing  policies)  as well  as on the extent  of restructuring 
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* Financial uncertainty. Capital markets must be created from scratch.18  It 
is hard  to know  how  long  it will  take to develop  institutions  and  to 
train investment  bankers,  analysts,  and  other  financial  experts.  An- 
other  element  of  financial  uncertainty  is the  treatment  of interenter- 
prise debts and arrears.19 
* Legal uncertainty. It is widely  recognized  that legal changes  related to 
property,  contract,  bankruptcy,  antitrust,  and  labor laws  ought  to be 
introduced  as soon  as possible.  The desire to tailor the laws to the EE 
environment  as well as the sheer burden of drafting the laws are likely 
to delay their introduction. 
* Political  uncertainty.  For historical reasons the ideology  of future govern- 
ments  is more uncertain  than in western  countries.  Consequently  it is 
somewhat  difficult to predict the tax structures and levels,  the treatment 
of  foreign  assets  and  trade,  the  commitment  to  a hardening  of  soft 
budget  constraints,  the willingness  to install a safety net, and so forth. 
Another  crucial feature of the EE environment  is the need  for a large- 
scale competition-  and  efficiency-oriented  restructuring.  As  previously 
mentioned,  firms are highly  integrated  horizontally  and vertically. Even 
ignoring  competitive  goals,  massive  break-ups  and  reorganizations  of 
the industries  will still be needed  for efficiency  purposes,  as the current 
structure  of  integration  reflects  historical  and  political  considerations 
more than any economic  rationale. Input management  will undergo  sub- 
stantial changes.  With labor hoarding  estimated  at above one-half of the 
work  force,  many  employees  will  be laid off (which  requires the quick 
establishment  of a safety  net  and  retraining programs).  Large invento- 
ries of inputs  will need  to be eliminated. 
5. Implications  for Eastern  Europe 
This section draws some implications  of the brief discussion  in Sections 2 
and  3 for the  EE environment  reviewed  in Section  4.  Appendix  1 will 
describe a possible  scenario reflecting these  implications. 
5.1 IMPLICATION  A: STOCK  MARKETS  WILL  WORK  POORLY  IN 
THE  NOISY  PHASE 
We contend  that the conditions  that make the trading of stocks a some- 
what  successful  institution  in western  economies  will not be present  in 
18. Existing banks are widely  thought  of as being unable to function in a market economy. 
19. Interfirm credit is pervasive  in EE. For instance,  around 40% of the book value  of the 
Polish  companies  to be  privatized  is in the  form of outstanding  liabilities from other 
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EE in the  next  few  years.  To see  this,  suppose  that whatever  policy  is 
adopted  leads to a somewhat  liquid stock market and significant trading 
on this market. 
Consider  first the informational  value  of stocks for management  con- 
trol. There are several  reasons  why  stock  prices  will  very  inaccurately 
measure  managerial  performance.  On  the one  hand,  price fluctuations 
will reflect the noise  in the firm's environment  more than the managers' 
value enhancement.  The other side of the same coin is that stock market 
participants  will focus  on learning  about government  policy, and input, 
capital, and labor market developments  more than on monitoring mana- 
gerial  activity.  (Surely,  this  type  of  learning  reduces  the  uncertainty 
about  the  firm's  exogenous  environment  and  allows  better  control  of 
managers,  but,  as  argued  in  Section  2,  the  cost  of  this  reduction  in 
uncertainty  is eventually  borne by the firm's owners.) 
On  the  other  hand,  market  analysts  in  western  economies  rely  on 
(besides  industry  studies)  the firm's income  statements  to forecast their 
future earnings.  Analysts  must work through income statements'  depre- 
ciation  and  amortization  to  assess  the  economic  value  of  assets,  and 
must  estimate  future tax liabilities from their (distinct) tax counterparts; 
in  so  doing  they  must  adjust  for firm specific  definitions  of variables. 
Thus  market  analysis  requires  accounting  structures  that  are reliable, 
undistorted,  and relatively homogeneous  across firms. It would  be naive 
to expect these  conditions  to be met rapidly. 
Still another  reason  to express  doubts  about a well-functioning  stock 
market is that it will  take time to set up an efficient  system  of financial 
regulation.  For instance,  it will be very  difficult to fight insider  trading 
without  a modern  system  keeping  track of transactions.  Similarly, one 
would  expect  a  fair amount  of  trading  based  on  private  information 
about forthcoming  government  reforms. It seems  unlikely that a govern- 
ment that is engaging  in so many reforms simultaneously  will be able to 
introduce  efficient financial regulation  rapidly. 
A final danger  of active  stock markets during  the noisy  phase  is that 
garbled  stock  market prices  may  give  the wrong  signals  for restructur- 
ing.  For instance,  the acquisition  of one  firm by another may be driven 
more  by  information  that  the  former is undervalued  than by  the  exis- 
tence of synergies. 
5.1.1 Corollaries  of Implication  A  The first corollary is the need for a stable 
ownership  of firms during the noisy phase. A stable core of owners is created, 
who  hold  on  to  their  firms  until  the  mature  phase.  We can  consider 
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* Entrepreneurship.  The firms are given  to a small number of individuals 
who  run them  as entrepreneurs. 
* Holding companies.  This option  creates an extra layer between  firms and 
their  final  owners.  A  small  number  of  holding  companies  own  the 
firms, and they themselves  are owned  by all citizens.  There are several 
variants on this, among  them,  mutual funds,  privatization companies, 
investment  banks,  and banks.  The distinction  refers to what the hold- 
ing  company  is  allowed  to  do  during  both  the  noisy  phase  and  the 
mature  phase.  During  the  noisy  phase,  investment  banks  and banks 
are indistinguishable.  They receive  deposits  and hold debt and equity 
positions  in the  firms. Mutual funds  and privatization  companies  are 
also  alike; they  do  not  receive  deposits  and  are pure  equity  holders. 
During the mature phase,  banks divest  themselves  of their equity, but 
continue  to receive  deposits  and to make loans (they are thus banks in 
the American  sense);  investment  banks keep  some  equity in the firms 
and are thus  engaged  in the same activities as during the noisy  phase 
(they  are thus  banks  in the  German or Japanese sense).  Privatization 
companies20 divest  themselves  of the firms during the noisy phase and 
disappear  thereafter.  In contrast,  mutual funds  remain equity holders 
after the  opening  of the  stock market at the beginning  of the mature 
phase.  (Note  that,  by  not  divesting  equity,  mutual  funds  are  to 
privatization companies  what investment  banks are to banks.) For con- 
creteness,  and unless  we  specify  otherwise,  we  will think of holdings 
as being  mutual  funds,  i.e.,  as being  pure equity holders  during both 
phases.21 But we  should  keep  in mind  that there are some  interesting 
variants on this. 
* Public ownership. The State keeps  control of the firms. 
Each of these  options  can be accompanied  by the distribution  of non 
tradable, minority  stakes to workers and management.  We discuss  them 
sequentially. 
The first option  (sometimes  called "cowboy capitalism") has been rec- 
ommended  by some  because  it recreates the "robber barons" so promi- 
nent  in the  late nineteenth-century  expansion  in the United  States.  Its 
main appeal  is that owners  are directly involved  in the firm's manage- 
ment,  which  alleviates  agency  problems.  Despite  this benefit,  we  find 
the option  unappealing.  Giving firms to entrepreneurs  would  be grossly 
20. See Blanchard et al. (1990), Saldanha and Milanovic (1990), and Siebert and Schmieding 
(1990). 
21. "Mutual fund" is actually a slight misnomer,  because the term usually does not suggest 
a strong  control  over  the  firms,  unlike  what  is  envisioned  here  for the  noisy  phase. 236 *  TIROLE 
unfair. And  one  can have  doubts  about whether  the distribution  of in- 
come  could  be  corrected  through  adequate  taxes.  Moderate  taxation 
would  leave  immense  wealth  to a handful  of lucky entrepreneurs  who 
inherit  healthy  firms or firms with  market power.  On  the  other hand, 
steep  taxation has  its own  limits.  It is likely to induce  entrepreneurs  to 
dissimulate  their income by (wastefully)  transforming it into perks. And, 
more fundamentally  (even  if income  diversion  can be prevented),  there 
are two  issues  concerning  the design  of an optimal  tax scheme:  the tax 
scheme  should  be tailored to the firm's environment  (which brings taxa- 
tion closer  to regulation),  and in this very noisy  environment  it will be 
difficult to design  appropriate schemes  that both give appropriate incen- 
tives  for  efficiency  and  extract  entrepreneurial  rents.  (This  point,  al- 
though  phrased  in  terms  of  the  government  designing  an  incentive 
scheme  for the entrepreneur,  is quite general.  The proposal  of creating 
robber barons is often couched  in terms of giving property rights to some 
highly leveraged  entrepreneurs.  The motivation  for having the entrepre- 
neurs borrow against future profits is, like for the taxation scheme,  one of 
fairness. However,  the very noisy environment  will make leverage a dan- 
gerous  policy. Firms will have a high probability of bankruptcy; further- 
more, the usual moral hazard problems-decapitalization,  choice of very 
risky projects-associated  with situations in which the firm is likely to be, 
but is not yet insolvent  are bound  to surface.) 
The  last  two  objections  we  have  to  the  entrepreneurial  solution  are 
linked with  the choice of the entrepreneurs.  Even more than in western 
economies,  there  is little information  about  who  is likely  to be a good 
entrepreneur.  Choosing  the wrong  person  may have  disastrous  conse- 
quences  for a firm (this issue  will also have to be addressed  for managers 
of holding  companies).  The other issue  is that the large potential  rents 
associated  with  becoming  one  of the  happy  few  will  politicize  the  ap- 
pointment  problem  (this is also true for the appointment  of managers of 
holding  companies,  but  the  rents  are  smaller  so  that  capture  of  the 
appointment  process  is a bit less likely).  We do not have a good  scheme 
to select entrepreneurs  in a rigid, nondiscretionary  way.22 
The  creation  of holding  companies  or their variants  is meant  to ad- 
dress  the  problems  associated  with  entrepreneurs:  in  particular,  the 
need  to tailor incentive  schemes  to the firm's environment,23 to increase 
22. Bidding  for the right to become  an entrepreneur  would  select former members  of the 
nomenklatura  (who  own  the wealth).  On the other hand, competing  on the basis of the 
amount  of leverage  one  is willing  to bear (instead  of bidding  an amount  of money  one 
is willing  to pay up front to be an entrepreneur)  will give  rise to the agency  problems 
analyzed  in the literature on credit rationing. 
23. Rausser and Simon (1991) argue that the firm's specificities should be reflected not only 
in  the  incentive  schemes,  but  also  in  the  very  way  it is privatized.  They  envision  a Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  237 
the informational  value of managerial performance,  and design  a mecha- 
nism to remove  bad managers.  The holding  company  in charge of moni- 
toring  a firm will  have  some  incentive  to  create  an  incentive  scheme 
appropriate  to the  firm,  and  to remove  bad managers.  And,  very  cru- 
cially, it will be managing  a portfolio of firms. Even though  the aggregate 
portfolio  will  be  quite  risky, it will  be  less  so  than  the  ownership  of a 
single firm: by the law of large numbers,  firm-specific shocks are diversi- 
fied  away.24 Also,  the  creation  of roughly  similar portfolios  will  enable 
incentive  schemes  to  filter  out  some  of  the  aggregate  noise  through 
relative performance  evaluation  among  holding  companies. 
A serious  concern with holding  companies  is that one creates an extra 
layer between  the real owners  of the firms (the citizens)  and the firms. 
The problem  of control of the managers  of holding  companies  is a diffi- 
cult, but important  one and will be addressed  later. 
Last,  public  ownership,  with  government  officials  on  the  board  of 
directors,  will  necessarily  prevail before the firms are incorporated  and 
privatized.  It ought  to be maintained  a while  longer  in the sectors  that 
need  to be broken up before privatization. 
Like those  of the managers  of holding  companies,  the incentives  of the 
government  officials to manage  the firms efficiently during the transition 
period will need  to be addressed.  In particular, there is an important risk 
that the government  be captured by the firms' employees.  Labor hoard- 
ing is likely  to remain,  and  wages  to be way  above  market wages.  An 
important  difference  with  public  enterprises  of  western  economies  is 
that, at least  at the beginning  of the noisy  phase,  there will be no obvi- 
ous yardstick to compare the wages  in the public sector to. Thus, govern- 
ment discretion  concerning  wages  will be large and so will be the risk of 
capture. 
To conclude  the discussion  of this first corollary of Implication A, we 
note  that  there  is  nothing  new  to the  idea  of creating  a core of  stable 
owners  in a phase  of uncertainty  and restructuring.  Stock markets have 
played  a minor  role  in  the  early  stage  of  the  development  of modern 
capitalism  in  the  United  States.  For instance,  a few  investment  banks 
(such  as the Morgan  investment  bank) played  a substantial  role before 
the  1933  Banking  Act  separating  commercial  and  investment  banks. 
hearing where the government  would solicit information  from intervenors  in order  to 
determine the method of privatization,  the structure  of access or control  rights in the 
firm, etc. The holding-company  method in contrast  does not tailor the privatization 
process to the firm's specificities  (beyond the fact that it falls in the large-industrial- 
firms  category). 
24. This argument  is reminiscent  of Diamond's (1984)  description  of the role of financial 
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Banker control over railroad trusts was  commonplace.25 Similarly, many 
of the  utility  systems  were  controlled  by bank-related  holding  compa- 
nies.  Large "interest groups"  such  as DuPont,  Mellon,  and Rockefeller 
dominated  the  corporate  scene.  The  idea  of  holding  companies  is  to 
recreate similar conditions  for restructuring without  the distasteful impli- 
cations for wealth  distribution. 
The second  corollary of Implication A is that the  firms' managers  ought to 
be given low-powered  incentive schemes. On  the  one  hand,  profits will  be 
very garbled measures  of performance.  On the other hand, in the (short- 
run) absence  of a stock market, there is no measure  of asset value and it 
is  difficult  to  give  managers  explicit  or implicit  incentives  to  increase 
their firm's value.  (One of course can give incentives  to managers based 
on the stock value  after the stock market starts functioning,  but the role 
of such incentives  is quite limited by the delay in measuring  asset value, 
and by the noise  and the reorganization  of assets  occurring in between.) 
The  difficulty  in  creating  long-term  incentives  adds  to  the  case  that 
short-term  incentives  based  on  the  firm's  profit  (bonuses)  should  be 
limited: Managers who  face primarily short-term incentives  are prone to 
focus  on  current  profits  to  the  detriment  of  future  profits  (this  effect 
comes  on  top  of  the  reduction  in  the  use  of bonuses  due  to  the  high 
uncertainty  about  profits).  So  one  is  constrained  to give  low-powered 
managerial incentives  across the board. 
5.2 IMPLICATION  B:  MOST  COMPETITION-ORIENTED 
RESTRUCTURING  OUGHT  TO TAKE  PLACE  BEFORE 
PRIVATIZATION 
As  discussed  in  Sections  2  and  3,  the  private  sector  may  undertake 
efficiency-oriented  restructuring,  but it will not promote competition  be- 
cause this would  reduce profits. And breaking up firms (horizontally and 
vertically) on the basis  of antitrust laws  has proved  difficult in western 
economies  and is likely to be a quagmire in countries without a tradition of 
antitrust enforcement.  So it seems  that competition-oriented  restructur- 
ing ought  to be undertaken  before private ownership  is introduced. 
Competition-oriented  restructuring of course need not affect all indus- 
tries.  Some  will  naturally  attract a large number  of firms and  be fairly 
25. For instance, 
very  often  the  railroad  reorganization  led  to the  establishment  of  voting  trusts,  with  very  impor- 
tant  powers  given  over  to  three  trustees  for  some  term  of  years  (typically  five),  partly  to  assure  the 
security  holders  that  responsible  management  would  be  in charge  during  the period of corpo- 
rate revival.  Investment  banker  domination  of these  voting  trusts  was  commonplace. 
(Herman,  1981, p.  118, emphasis  added). Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  239 
competitive  on their own.  Others can be made competitive  by the open- 
ing of the country to foreign competition.  We should,  however,  not view 
foreign competition  as a panacea for monopoly  power.  First, it can affect 
only  tradables.  Second,  the government  may be captured by industries 
or else  be  pressured  by  trade deficits,  and  may impose  tariffs or other 
forms of protection.  Third, some  (at least temporary) protection is likely 
to be justified  in some  industries;  while  not starting from scratch, many 
firms cannot  compete  on the international  market at this stage and will 
need  some  protection  to  develop  to  a healthy  level  (this  is  the  infant 
industry  argument). 
The corollary of Implication  B is,  as we  have already noted,  that firms 
in industries that are potentially noncompetitive  should be kept a while longer 
under public ownership  before  they are handed  in to the stable  private investors. 
Clearly there will be no time to fine-tune  the break-up of firms. Only 
the  most  obvious  and  simpler  divestitures  ought  to  be  implemented. 
Needless  to say, mistakes  in evaluating  synergies  between  units  or fu- 
ture market conditions  will be committed  in such a short time frame. For 
instance,  it may be the case that the merger commission  (to be created) 
will later allow  the reunification  of units previously  broken up, because 
this  is needed  to  face  foreign  competition.  Yet we  would  expect  some 
major competitive  gains  to be obtained by some  simple break-ups. 
In our opinion,  the main hurdle will be the government's  commitment 
to carry out divestitures  where  these  are needed.  Pressures  from firms' 
employees  to keep  the monopoly  positions  will be strong.  The govern- 
ment  may  also  be  tempted  to  preserve  the  firms' monopoly  power  to 
make  holding  companies  (or  entrepreneurs,  depending  on  the  case) 
more successful  financially  (this might  be the EE equivalent  of western 
experiences  of  not  breaking  up  monopolies  in  order  to  derive  more 
revenues  from privatization). 
One possibility  to deal with this problem is to create a divestiture  commis- 
sion that would  be composed  of (a majority of) independent  government 
representatives  and (a minority of) representatives  of foreign lenders and 
donors,  who  would  be  advised  by  domestic  and  foreign  experts  and 
industry  delegates  without  voting  power.  Linking,  through  moral sua- 
sion,  foreign aid26  to a minimum  effort to create competition  might be an 
incentive  for the  government  to undertake  some  competition-oriented 
restructuring.  The  government  representatives  could  not  be  easily  re- 
26. In this respect, the foreign representatives  need not necessarily  belong to institutions 
engaged in micro  projects  (European  Bank  for Reconstruction  and Development,  Inter- 
national Finance Corporation)  and could also belong to the World Bank, the IMF, 
USAID,  or lending countries.  Some merger  experts  from  the U.S. Department  of Justice 
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moved  by their government  (as is the case for instance  of justices on the 
U.S.  Supreme  Court27),  and thus  would  be less  subject to political pres- 
sure. The presence  of representatives  of foreign lenders  on the commis- 
sion  might  prevent  some  extreme  decisions,  and  mainly  would  allow 
some  monitoring  of decision  making. 
5.3 IMPLICATION  C: THE  THREAT  OF CAPTURE  OF 
GOVERNMENT  DECISION  MAKING  BY  INTEREST  GROUPS  IS, 
DURING  THE  TRANSITION  PERIOD,  MORE  SERIOUS  IN EE  THAN 
IN WESTERN  ECONOMIES 
Since  at least  Montesquieu  and  the  American  Federalists,  it has  been 
well  understood  that strong  safeguards  must be put in place to prevent 
governments  from  serving  the  interests  of  specific  groups.  Many  of 
these  safeguards  did not exist under the previous  regimes  and will take 
time to install: organization  and rotation in the civil service,  administra- 
tive  procedures  and  regulatory  hearings,  independent  administrative 
courts,  checks  and balances  in government,  development  of a tradition 
of investigative  reporting  by the media,  etc. Furthermore, historical cir- 
cumstances  are likely  to  create  a close  relationship  between  regulator 
and regulated,  similar to the one  associated  with  the revolving  door in 
western  economies. 
How  will  the  threat  of  capture  influence  the  transition  process?  We 
already  mentioned  the  issue  of  the  governments'  commitment  to  do- 
mestic  competition.  The  commitment  to  introducing  foreign  competi- 
tion is also a serious  issue.  While the fragility of the industries  seems  to 
warrant some  temporary  protection,  the  process  of trade liberalization 
may  be  captured  and  trade  barriers never  be  removed.  Protection,  if 
any,  should  thus  be  accompanied  with  a clear, nondiscretionary  time 
table for liberalization. 
Another  implication  of the idea is that it may be dangerous  to give the 
government  control  over  the  holding  companies  (during  the  noisy 
phase).  (These  companies  would  be  regular  joint  stock  companies 
traded  on  the  stock  market,  or  else  would  disappear,  in  the  mature 
phase.)  The  government  could  then  force  the  holding  companies  to 
implement  demagogic  policies  in  the  firms  they  control  or to  induce 
those  firms to collude  on the product market. 
Yet another  implication  of the idea is that regulated  firms ought  to be 
27. A distinction  to be made is that independent  civil servants in western  economies  often 
have  a long  tenure.  Because  the  divestiture  commission  is  meant  to be  ephemeral, 
there is a danger  that, despite  their independence,  government  representatives  might 
be pressured  by their governments  through  the threat of bleak future job prospects.  A 
possibility  is that the members  of the divestiture  commission  be reallocated later to the 
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subject to low-powered  incentive  schemes,  which  as we  saw in Section 3 
create little scope  for discretion  and thus capture. 
Last, there should  be a timetable for the privatization process to which 
the government  would  be committed.  All its steps should be simple and 
clearly defined.28 Overall,  the corollary of Implication C is thus  that one 
should pay attention to the discretion  left to regulators. 
5.4 IMPLICATION  D: THE  MAIN ATTRACTION  OF FOREIGN  AID 
FOR  THE  TRANSITION  PROCESS  MAY  NOT BE  EXPERTISE,  BUT 
RATHER  COMMITMENT  AND INDEPENDENCE  FROM  INTEREST 
GROUPS 
Governments  and private sectors can use the aid of international donors 
and lenders  to hire foreign expertise by themselves.  The experts may be, 
but need  not  be  supplied  by  the  donors  and  lenders.  A more  specific 
attraction of foreign  aid is that foreign  institutions  are likely to be freer 
than governments  from capture by domestic  interest groups,  and it may 
well  be  that  some  amount  of  their involvement  in  the  reform process 
would  commit  the countries  to a right course of action. 
Certainly, foreign  involvement  raises a familiar dilemma.  The foreign 
donors  and  lenders  are themselves  not always  free from pressure  from 
the governments  that finance  them.  Furthermore,  they  may push  their 
internal agenda  rather than the most appropriate policy for the country. 
There is thus  a danger  of relinquishing  national  sovereignty  to foreign- 
ers. Some  arrangement  has to be found  in each instance  that preserves 
national  sovereignty,  and  yet  uses  foreigners  as  partial  safeguards 
against capture. 
Let us mention  two other cases in which  foreign institutions  might be 
used  as a commitment  device.  First, they  might  be given  voting  rights 
(with possibly  no  claim to income)  in boards  of directors  of holding compa- 
nies. Other members  of the board would  be government  representatives 
and  delegates  of shareholders  (the  citizens).  Giving  minority  stakes  to 
each of the three groups  preserves  national sovereignty;  it also raises the 
possibility  that  the  foreign  institutions  make  the  case  for efficiency  in 
board  meetings  and  influence  the  possibly  less  experienced  and  in- 
formed delegates  of shareholders. 
Second,  those  international  financial institutions  that directly lend  to 
the private sector (as will be the case for the European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development,  and is the case for the International Finance 
Corporation) may be used  as a commitment  to harden  the  firms' soft budget 
28. By "simple,"  we  mean  "not informationally  demanding."  For instance,  a regulatory 
rule  of  the  type  "charge  marginal  cost"  looks  simple,  but  is  extremely  complex  to 
implement  because  it requires cost information  that is hard to obtain.  Informationally 
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constraint during  the  noisy  phase.  Firms will  need  financing  for new 
projects  and  maintenance.  The  financing  by  domestic  banks,  whether 
public or private, raises some problems,  besides  the fact that the banking 
system  is not well  developed  and is in financial distress  in some  coun- 
tries (including  Poland).  Public banks  are likely  to adhere  to the  long- 
standing  tradition of the soft budget  constraint.  The government  has an 
incentive  to cede  to managers  and employees  afraid of losing  their jobs, 
and  rescue  insolvent  banks  and  firms,  leaving  painful  restructuring  to 
future administrations. 
The use  of private domestic  banks (without  equity holding)  raises the 
issue  of their regulation.  The large aggregate  uncertainty  makes  insol- 
vency  of a substantial  fraction of banks  a real possibility.  The threat of 
insolvency  together  with  the  prospect  of  being  bailed  out  in  case  of 
trouble gives  rise to moral hazard,  with  the banks continuing  to lend to 
financially troubled firms in the hope  things will get better in the future, 
and more generally  engaging  in risky projects.  (The regulatory slippage 
in the United  States in the 1980s illustrates how  financial regulation can 
go  awry  even  in  a country  with  a long  experience  in  the  matter. The 
savings  and loans were  subjected  to new  and looser regulatory account- 
ing principles  and to lower  capital requirements  in order to allow insol- 
vent institutions  to continue.  The hope was that they would  recover and 
the motivation  was  to reduce immediate  political costs.) 
Financial regulation  is no easy matter. To discourage  excessively  risky 
investment,  one  ought  in theory  to subject savings  institutions  to "risk- 
based  capital  requirements,"  with  the  requirements  based  on  the 
estimated  value  of  assets  in  different  economic  scenarios  and  being 
continuously  adjusted.  Even western  economies  are reluctant to adopt 
such  flexible  financial  regulations  because  of  the  burden  they  impose 
on  regulators,  and  because  of  the  substantial  discretion  conferred  on 
them.  It is quite  difficult  for regulators  to estimate  risks appropriately, 
and  it is easy  for them  to misreport  actual risks.  One  may  have  some 
doubts  about  the  efficiency  of banking  systems  in  the  near future  for 
countries  lacking a tradition of financial regulation. 
The issue  seems  to be  to find  a way  to give  lenders  an incentive  to 
monitor  firms and to stop  financing  them when  they become  insolvent. 
Such considerations  should  come  to mind  when  defining  a role for the 
EBRD. Will the EBRD have such an incentive? Should it play the role of a 
merchant  bank,  taking only  minimal  stakes itself and bringing  in loans 
of  private  foreign  investors?  If it  plays  the  role  of  a merchant  bank, 
should  it guarantee  the  private loans,  and,  if it does  so,  would  not the 
lack of incentives  for private foreign debt holders to monitor firms justify 
centralizing  loans  and have the EBRD be the only lender? Or should  the Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  243 
interests  of private foreign  debt holders  be subordinated  to the interests 
of the EBRD to give them an incentive  to monitor? These are a few of the 
questions  to be addressed  here. 
A conjecture is that the best use of foreign financing is debt rather than 
equity. Financing by domestic  banks creates the two problems of commit- 
ment and regulation,  which  suggests  some substitution  by foreign loans. 
(A distinct  motivation  for foreigners  lending  rather than  taking equity 
positions  is that it would  face a lower  opprobrium  in the EE countries.) 
5.5 IMPLICATION  E:  THE  STOCK  MARKET  MUST  BE 
APPROPRIATELY  INTRODUCED  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF THE 
MATURE  PHASE 
Even after the  legal  framework  (ownership,  contract, bankruptcy, anti- 
trust laws,  disclosure  rules, etc.) is put in place, and professionals  (audi- 
tors,  analysts,  managers,  and  so  on)  are trained,  the  stock market will 
not run smoothly  overnight.  We saw  in Section  3 that the liquidity  for 
the stocks is what  creates an incentive  for analysts to estimate the firms' 
values  and  to  discover  synergies.  We would  expect  little liquidity  in a 
stock market restricted to holding  companies.29 On the other hand, open- 
ing stock markets to individuals,  to newly  created firms and institutional 
investors,  and  possibly  to foreigners  is likely to create such  a liquidity. 
While the final objective is to give wide access to stock markets, we must 
think about the consequences  of immersing  small investors  directly into 
a market where  stock prices have  never been quoted.  Big investors  will 
be needed  to invest  in acquiring information  about real market values. 
Sophisticated  small investors,  who will be unable to obtain detailed infor- 
mation,  will be reluctant to trade with  the informed big investors  in the 
presence  of such uncertainty  about true values,  as they are likely to lose 
their  shirts.  On  the  other  hand,  unsophisticated  small  investors  (and 
there are likely to be many at the beginning  given  the lack of experience 
with  stock  markets)  may  not  realize the risk they  face.  They would  be 
the ones  to create liquidity in the market. This goes  against fairness and 
against the building  of a popular trust and political support for the stock 
market institution.  Furthermore,  liquidity trading would  create noise  in 
the initial pricing of stocks (as it does  in all stock markets). 
5.5.1  Remark  An  interesting  parallel is that of a primary initial public 
offering by a company  not yet quoted  on the stock market.30  A company 
29. Once bilateral  trades  of assets to achieve synergies  have taken  place, it is not clear  why 
holding companies should trade among themselves. The gain for one becomes a loss 
for the other, as discussed in Section  3. 
30. See, e.g., Brealey  and Myers (1988,  pp. 329-332) for a description. 244 *  TIROLE 
that goes  public in general  selects  an underwriter  and both agree on an 
issue  price.  The  registration  statement  submitted  to the  Securities  and 
Exchange Commission  (in the United  States) as well as presentations  to 
institutional  investors  convey  information  to potential buyers.  It is inter- 
esting  to note that potential  buyers are usually big, sophisticated  buyers 
when  the firm goes public and when  therefore no previous price informa- 
tion can be reflected  in the current price. 
In contrast, initial public offerings associated  with the privatizations in 
western  economies  (in the United  Kingdom  and in France, for example) 
have  tried to reach small investors  through  substantial  discounts  [they 
also devised  schemes  to allow employees  to buy shares in their firms on 
favorable terms-see  Vickers and Yarrow (1990a) for a description of this 
in the case of the United  Kingdom  and Chile]. 
The problem  of inception  of the stock market in EE (under the corol- 
lary of Implication  A that firms are controlled  by a stable owner  during 
the noisy  phase)  seems  to be closer  to that of U.S.  firms' going  public 
than to that of U.K.  state-owned  enterprises  being  privatized,  and this 
for two  reasons:  First,  the  number  of  firms  to  be  privatized  is  much 
larger than in the United Kingdom  (the United Kingdom privatized only 
a dozen  big firms in 10 years); second,  the design  of the inception  of the 
stock market must  take into account  the incentives  of the firm's private 
owner  before the stock market opens.31 
There  are several  ways  to introduce  the  stock market.  For instance, 
one can let the holding  companies,  and possibly  foreigners,  bid for firms 
at the beginning  of the mature phase,  with  the proceeds  of the auction 
going  to the previous  owners  of the firms; the stock market would  later 
be opened  to  the  general  public  once  prices  have  stabilized.  To create 
some  liquidity,  one  might  for instance  force the  holding  companies  to 
divest  some  of their shares. 
This brings us to a discussion  of what  goals the inception  of the stock 
market in the mature phase  must meet.  Here are some desirable proper- 
ties of associated  auctions: 
1.  Generate  information  about  firm value:  the  auction  should  yield  a 
picture  of  asset  value.  This  information  is  useful  for assessing  the 
relative performance  of holding  companies  during the noisy phase as 
well as to set up appropriate incentive  schemes  for the firm's manag- 
ers for the mature phase.  As discussed  above,  little information  will 
31. But there  are also  differences  with  initial  public  offerings  of private  companies.  For 
instance,  agency  problems  before the offering are less serious when  only the entrepre- 
neur  and  possibly  a venture  capitalist  are involved  than  when  the  firm belongs  to a 
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be generated by the illiquid market  created  by voluntary sales by the 
holding companies. A possibility is to set aside a fraction a of the 
shares of each firm of each holding to be sold at the inception stage, 
and  on  which  the  owning  holding  company  is not allowed  to bid.32 
2.  Create an appropriate  structure  of control with large, but not domi- 
nant shareholders.33  One possibility for this is to set c  >  0.5, and 
prevent any bidder in the auction from acquiring  a majority  of shares 
himself.34 
3.  Give incentives for holdings to monitor and invest during the noisy 
phase: Because the value of the firm's assets is partly  reflected  in the 
bids at the inception stage, giving the proceeds of the auction to the 
previous owner yields incentives to invest. However, it may be useful 
to let the holding keep a minority share in the firm (a < 1) to give it 
further  incentives to invest.35 
4.  Prevent cartelization:  The selection of allowed bidders (other hold- 
ings, other domestic and foreign firms)  should prevent the creation  of 
interlocking directorates that would  create horizontal collusion or 
vertical  foreclosure  in concentrated  industries. 
6. Summary 
We argued that two key specificities  of the EE  transition  process are the 
unusually high level of uncertainty in the firms' environment and the 
nonstationarity  in its level. From  there followed our main points: 
32. There is a large literature  on "common-value  auctions"  with information  acquisition, 
that ought to guide the design of such auctions (e.g., Milgrom,  1981;  Lee, 1982;  Mat- 
thews, 1984). This literature  has looked at simple auctions, in general the first-price 
auction, and derived equilibria  (Riley,  1988,  allows the winner's  price  to depend on the 
other bids and on the stock's future performance  and might be particularly  relevant 
here). A recurring  theme of this literature  is that bidders  acquire  too much information 
from  a social viewpoint. This conclusion  comes from  the assumption  that the informa- 
tion has no other role than redistributing  income, which is the case if the value of the 
stock is exogenously given. Here, the information  revealed by the auction has social 
value because it helps measure the previous owner's performance  and initialize the 
managers'  stock incentives. New theoretical  work in this area  linking ex post auctions 
with ex ante incentives would be most welcome. 
33. The market may perform such an adjustment  itself after the auction stage. The idea 
behind avoiding the formation  of majority  shareholders  is to limit the need for costly 
controls  to prevent minority  squeeze outs following the auction. 
34. Effective  control may require  less than 50%,  depending on the distribution  of shares. 
35. Laffont  and Tirole (1988), building on ideas in Williamson  (1976),  study the issue of 
investment in a repeated auction context, and show that to promote unobservable 
investments, the incumbent  firm should be favored  at the renewal stage and that the 
power of his incentive scheme should grow over time. See also Stein's (1988, 1989) 
related work on managerial  myopia. In the context of an auction with information 
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1.  Stock  markets  cannot function well during the noisy phase. The large 
amount of noise as well as the absence of trained  analysts and reliable 
accounting data will deprive stock prices of most of their information 
content. The EE environment seems to call for hands-on monitoring 
by a stable ownership. 
2.  Managers of firms and holdings must face low-powered incentive 
schemes during the noisy phase, which raises a concern about effi- 
ciency. Alternative  incentive mechanisms must be devised: e.g., close 
monitoring of firms by holdings and of holdings by independent 
directors, relative performance  evaluation for holding managers and 
holding directors, and career  concerns for all. 
3.  Because of the asymmetry  between preventing mergers  and breaking 
up firms, market structure  interventions to prevent horizontal  collu- 
sion and vertical  foreclosure  are best performed  before privatization. 
A divestiture commission ought to be given incentives (in particular 
be free from interest group pressure) to rapidly  perform  break-ups  in 
those industries where anticompetitive  behavior  is a concern. 
4.  Regulated  firms should be given low-powered incentive schemes dur- 
ing the noisy phase to limit the level of rents as well as to respond to 
the high threat of regulatory capture. Incentives should be raised 
during the mature phase. 
5.  Because privatization ought to occur before the introduction of a 
stock market, specific plans must be made for the inception of the 
stock market, that reflect the considerations  discussed in Section 5.5. 
The purpose of this paper has not been to formulate precise policy 
recommendations.  Besides the fact that our theoretical  understanding  is 
still limited, policy recommendations  should be tailored  to the industrial 
and political realities of each country. The issue is not only to quantify 
the various parameters  of the theoretical  analysis-e.g.,  the likely length 
of the noisy phase, the number of holdings, or the list of industries  with 
potential market structure problems. It is also to adjust the theoretical 
framework  to account for further  fairness  considerations,  for the political 
economy of commitment or for the difficulty in regaining control over 
firms,36  depending on the country's  specificities.  The scenario  developed 
in Appendix 1 must be viewed in the light of this comment. It sole 
purpose is to further clarify  and refine the analysis of Section 5 and not 
to design a ready-to-use proposal. 
36. See  Dewatripont  and  Roland  (1990) for  interesting  considerations  on  the  means  to 
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APPENDIX  1: A SCENARIO 
The purpose  of this  appendix  is to examine  a scenario  involving  hold- 
ings,  that is consistent  with  the  implications  of Section  5.  Appendix  2 
discusses  the incentives  inherent  to this scenario and some  of its draw- 
backs. Appendix  3 points  at the analogies  and differences  of the associ- 
ated governance  structure with  that of growth  companies. 
We break each phase  into "subphases"  or "periods": 
Noisy  Phase  Mature Phase 
o  I  |  >  time 
Definition  Private Restructuring  Inception  Market Period 
Period  Period  Period 
1. Definition  period 
This period, among other things, reallocates  capital. 
1.  A  divestiture  commission  is  created  with  independent  representa- 
tives  of government  and representatives  of international institutions 
on its board,  assisted  by domestic  and foreign experts.  The commis- 
sion  will  perform  the  most  obvious  cases  of  competition-oriented 
restructuring. 
2.  Firms are renationalized,  and then  divided  into three groups  by the 
divestiture  commission.  The first group consists  of the firms in natu- 
rally competitive  sectors  or in  sectors  in which  foreign  competition 
will not substantially  hinder  the growth  of firms. These  firms will be 
allocated  to  holding  companies  as  soon  as  possible.  The  second 
group consists  of firms that will need  to be broken up by the divesti- 
ture  commission  before  being  handed  to  the  holding  companies  at 
the  end  of  the  definition  period.  The  third  group  is  composed  of 
natural monopolies  and  will either remain under  public ownership, 
or else be transferred to the holding  companies  and remain regulated 
in the long  term. 
3.  A safety net is created to protect workers from the hardships  created 
by the forthcoming  private restructuring period. 
4.  The  main  elements  of property,  contract,  bankruptcy, and  antitrust 
laws are enunciated  and put into operation. 
5.  Holding  companies  are created and incorporated. 248 *  TIROLE 
The number of holding  companies  depends  on country size and avail- 
able expertise.  It must be large enough  to obtain effective  monitoring  of 
the firms, to limit the holdings'  political power,  and to avoid interlocking 
directorates  of firms in tightly oligopolistic  industries  (see below).  But it 
must  be  small  enough  for the  holdings  to own  similar and  diversified 
portfolios.37 
The shares of a holding  company  are distributed freely and equally to 
all citizens  but will not be traded before the mature phase.38 The holding 
company's  board  of  directors  includes  representatives  of  the  govern- 
ment,  of  international  institutions,  and  of  the  shareholders  (all with 
minority  voting  rights).39 Directors  have  fiduciary  duty  and,  like  the 
holding  company's  managers  (see  below),  are rewarded  with  stocks, 
with a strong element  of relative performance evaluation. 
The board of directors selects  the holding  companies'  managers,  and 
puts them on an incentive  scheme.  During the noisy phase,  managers of 
the holding  companies  receive a salary. At the inception  period,  they are 
rewarded  on  the  basis  of  the  absolute  performance  of  their  holding 
company  (through  stock  options)  and,  more  importantly,  through  the 
performance  of their holding  company  compared  to the average perfor- 
mance  of  other  holding  companies.  Low-powered  incentive  schemes, 
i.e.,  small stock options,  seem  appropriate.  The main incentives  for the 
37. A small number  of holdings implies a large  number  of firms  per holding and, possibly, 
reduced  monitoring  of each firm. On the other hand, holdings should be given similar 
portfolios to be comparable;  increasing the number of firms per holding improves 
comparability  by reducing  on average  the ex post inequities  in the distribution  of firms 
to holdings. To accommodate  these two goals, the holding companies might not be 
given firms  in all industries  but rather  specialize  in a subset of industries.  Their  perfor- 
mance would then be compared with that of holdings with similar  portfolios  rather 
than with that of the average holding. Alternatively,  one could have holdings own 
firms in overlapping subsets of industries, and design more complex relative  perfor- 
mance evaluations  to enlarge  the comparison  group. 
The concern about the holdings' political power relates to the existence of a few 
powerful groups with congruent interests. The congruence  of interests is in part cre- 
ated by the desire to set up comparable  portfolios. 
Yet  another consideration  that may be relevant  to the choice of number  of holding 
companies  is that there should be enough of them in order  for  incentive  schemes  based 
on relative  performance  evaluation  not to lead to perverse  incentives  (with two holding 
companies, say, beating on the other holding company may become a goal in its own 
right, while with many holding companies, a holding company  cannot  affect  the aver- 
age performance  of the others much). 
38. The distribution  of shares can await the mature phase as the plan is not to create  an 
active stock market  before then. It may still be the case that a secondary  market  opens 
during the noisy phase with the private  sector  exchanging  options on the shares to be 
distributed.  We would still expect trade to be substantially  smaller  in the noisy phase 
than if a regular  market  existed for the shares. 
39. Because of the scarcity of trained private-sector businessmen,  representatives  of share- 
holders  might be former members  of the controlling  ministries,  professors,  or the like. Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  249 
holding  companies'  managers  during  the  noisy  phase,  besides  relative 
performance evaluation,  are career concerns and monitoring by the direc- 
tors. The managers  can be fired by the board of directors, in which  case 
they  receive  only  a fraction of the  final reward at the inception  period 
equal to the length  of their tenure in the holding  company divided by the 
total length  of the noisy  phase.40 
The holding  companies  are endowed  with the shares of the firms to be 
privatized (in the middle  of the definition  period for the firms that do not 
need  to be broken  up,  and  at the  end  of the  definition  period  for the 
others).  There  are two  variants:  (1) Each firm is  allocated  to  a  single 
holding  company,  and  2)  each  firm is  shared  among  several  holding 
companies.  We  will  consider  the  first  variant  for  concreteness.41  (As 
mentioned  in the  text,  one  can also consider  a situation  where  holding 
companies  are debt as well  as equity holders.  For simplicity, we develop 
the case of pure equity  holding  in more detail.) 
Firms are allocated  randomly  to the holding  companies  to avoid cap- 
ture as well as to roughly  equalize  the initial quality of portfolios among 
holding  companies.  In tightly oligopolistic  industries  with little prospect 
for intense  foreign competition,  firms are allocated to holding companies 
so  as  to  prevent  common  ownership  of  product  market  competitors. 
Similarly, where  there is a danger of foreclosure,  common  ownership  of 
a vertical structure is avoided. 
1.  The managers  of the firms are given employment  contracts. Bonuses, 
stock options,  and relative performance evaluation  are limited by the 
large aggregate  and idiosyncratic  uncertainty and by the fact that the 
firms  may  divest  themselves  of  assets  or receive  assets  from other 
firms of the  same  or another  holding  company.  Where the realloca- 
tion  of  capital  across  firms  proceeds  quickly,  the  managers  can be 
given  some  stock options  and bonuses  linked  to the performance  of 
their firm.42  The main incentives  for the firms' managers  during  the 
40. This is to guarantee  that firing  managers  does not per se increase  shareholders'  wealth. 
In western economies, managers  often exercise their stock options when they quit or 
are dismissed. But  they cannot  do so in this scenario  because  the stock  market  is not yet 
active in the noisy phase. 
41. Giving  a firm  to a single holding company  prevents  free riding  in the monitoring  of the 
firm. Giving it to several holding companies may increase the diversification  of the 
portfolios  of the holding companies;  it also may offer a diversity  of views and prevent 
disastrous  reorganizations  brought  about  by a single, incompetent  team. 
42. There  is an argument  for focusing on "external  restructuring"  first  so as to create  well- 
defined entities quickly.  Managers  will be somewhat reluctant  to perform  the "internal 
restructuring"  (elimination  of labor  hoarding,  reorganization  of management  and pro- 
duction  processes, etc.); defining the boundaries  of the firm  early  will make  them more 
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noisy  phase  are career concerns  and,  especially,  monitoring  by  the 
holding  companies. 
2.  Regulation  of public  enterprises  and private regulated  firms is as in 
the private restructuring  period  (see below). 
3.  A merger commission  is created (possibly  the divestiture commission 
becomes  the merger commission  after having  broken up firms). 
2. Private  restructuring  period 
1.  Holding companies  restructure  firms: They make sure that labor hoarding 
is eliminated  and that insolvent  firms are shut down.  They reallocate 
capital and eliminate inefficient vertical integration.  They monitor the 
firms'  managers  in  their attempt  to organize  production  efficiently. 
Holding  companies  may sell units or firms to one another subject to 
the approval of the merger commission  when  they have assets in the 
same industry. The sale of assets  may be used by the holding  compa- 
nies  to purchase  other assets  or may be invested  in indexed  bonds.43 
2.  The government  completes  the legal system. 
3.  The government  sets up agencies  to regulate the banking  sector and 
the  stock  market.  These  agencies  will  later prevent  insider  trading, 
enforce disclosure  and conflict-of-interest  rules, monitor savings insti- 
tutions,  etc. 
4.  The government  sets  a timetable  for trade liberalization and defines 
foreign exchange  guarantees  for the capital inflows.44 
5.  Firms put modern  accounting  structures in place. 
6.  Borrowing:  The  EE industries  will  need  money  for updating  current 
technologies  and for financing  new  investments.  First, they may bor- 
row  western  capital  (from private  lenders  as  well  as  from interna- 
tional institutions).  As we  noted  earlier, the comparative  advantage 
of foreign  participation  might  be  loans  rather than  equity  holdings 
because  of the commitment  and regulation  problems associated  with 
financing  by domestic  banks.  Furthermore,  foreign  equity financing 
is likely to be restricted on political grounds  anyway.  Because the EE 
economies  will  need  substantial  inflows  of  capital  from  western 
economies,45  it seems  natural  that  privatized  firms look  abroad for 
debt holders. 
43. Alternatively,  they could  distribute  dividends  to the shareholders.  An accounting  sys- 
tem would  then have to be devised  that would  keep track of dividends  and compound 
them  at  the  rate  of  interest  so  that  the  wealths  of  the  holding  companies  can  be 
compared  at the inception  period. 
44. See Newbery  (1990a,b) for a discussion  of the sequencing  of trade liberalization. 
45. See,  e.g.,  Frydman and Rapaczynski  (1990). Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  *  251 
A second  source of financing  may come from private domestic  savings 
(I do  not  have  much  feel  for how  large  these  private  savings  will  be 
during  the  noisy  phase).  An  interesting  issue  is  whether  one  should 
allow holding  companies  to receive deposits  and channel them to firms, 
in which  case the holding  companies  would  be similar to the U.S. invest- 
ment banks of the early twentieth  century. 
Should  the creditors (foreign and domestic)  lend their money  directly 
to  the  firms  or indirectly  through  the  holding  companies?  In the  sce- 
nario considered  here,  with  each firm controlled  by a single  holding,  it 
would  seem  difficult  to channel  loans  directly to the  firms.  A holding 
company  would  then  have  an  incentive  to  strip  some  of  its  firms  of 
their assets  through  low  transfer prices for intermediate  goods  or physi- 
cal assets  charged  to other  firms of the  holding  company.46 To prevent 
this behavior,  the  holding  company  must  be liable for its firms' debts, 
or, more realistically, the loans  must be channelled  to the firms through 
the holding  company.  (Such stripping  of the firms' assets  is more diffi- 
cult,  although  not  impossible,  if the  firms are held  by  several  holding 
companies  with  minority  shares.  In  this  case,  direct  lending  to  the 
firms becomes  a possibility.) 
1.  Each holding  company  hires or trains domestic  and foreign analysts, 
who  start studying  the  potential  of the  firms (not only  the  holding 
company's)  that the holding  company  will be allowed  to bid on. 
2.  Regulated  private  firms  (owned  by  holding  companies)  are subject 
to  cost-of-service  regulation.  The  standard  for  cost  of  service  is 
variable cost  plus  a fair rate of return on the investment  sunk  since 
the beginning  of the process.  No  attempt  is made  to assess  the rate 
base  (amount  of  capital) before  the  beginning  of the  process.  Thus 
prices  only  reflect  new  investments.  Price  reviews  are  frequent 
(every  six  months,  say)  in  order  to  adjust  to  a  rapidly  changing 
environment.47 
46. U.S. courts  have long recognized  that  a corporation  must have the authority  to act  in its 
own best interests to be identified as a separate  corporation  and be subject  to limited 
liability  in case of insolvency. For example, in a well-known case (Henderson  et al. v. 
Rounds & Porter  Lumber  Co. 99F.  Supp 376, U.S. District  Court,  W.D.  Arkansas  1951), 
a timber processor was forced to sell lumber at half the market price to a lumber 
company  that owned half of its shares, and was led to insolvency.  The  judge ruled  that 
the latter  company was liable  for the former's  debts. 
47. Not including  historical  capital  into the rate  base considerably  simplifies  the regulatory 
process. Yet  cost-of-service  regulation  will not be a trivial  exercise.  Multiproduct  firms 
will need to allocate common costs to each output according  to some arbitrary,  fully 
distributed  cost accounting system. Other issues familiar  from the regulation  of U.S. 
utilities will surface: the choice of the rate of depreciation  for new investment, the 
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Given  that we  have  strong  reservations  about cost-of-service  regula- 
tion in general,  we  will need  to justify  this regulatory recommendation 
in Appendix  2. 
3.  State  owned  enterprises  are  also  subject  to  some  form  of  cost-of- 
service regulation.  There are serious concerns about the management 
of these  state-owned  firms. For instance,  the employees  are likely to 
ask for high  wages,  which  the government  is likely to grant (this is a 
serious  concern  in private firms subject to cost-of-service  regulation 
as well.  But in those  firms, the presence  of private owners  may allevi- 
ate  this  concern  a bit).  In a sense  this  problem  is  the  same  as that 
facing  state-owned  enterprises  in  western  economies,  but  some  of 
the  safeguards  there,  like  the  benchmark  of  market  wages  in  the 
private sector and the control of ministries  in charge by independent 
general  accounting  offices,  are much  weaker in EE. Serious thought 
should  be given  to the creation of commitment  mechanisms  for disci- 
plining  state-owned  enterprises. 
3. Inception  of the  stock  market 
Holding  companies,  newly  created firms, and institutional investors,  and 
possibly  foreigners48  bid on each firm. The proprietor of the firm receives 
the proceeds  of the auction.  Holding  companies  bid in units of currency. 
Those who have a negative balance after the auctions issue indexed bonds 
in the corresponding  amount  to the government.  Those with  a positive 
balance receive a corresponding  amount  in indexed  bonds from the gov- 
ernment.  (Or else  the holding  companies  balance their accounts  among 
themselves.)  Some constraints  are put on the auctions: 
First, a mechanism  is  set  up  to  prevent  interlocking  directorates  in 
tightly  oligopolistic  industries.49 For instance,  in an industry  with  two 
large firms, a simple-minded  mechanism  has half of the holding  compa- 
nies bid on one firm and the other half bid on the other firm. 
Second,  to induce  trade among  holding  companies  and  therefore  to 
create incentives  to collect during the noisy  phase information about the 
firm's value,  a fraction of each firm can be earmarked for holding compa- 
48. There are arguments suggesting that foreign bidding will be limited, related to the 
deep-seated fears of a foreign takeover (Blanchard  et al., 1990), to the threat of ex- 
propriation  of foreign capital, and to the problems  caused by the appreciation  of the 
local currency  brought about by a large sudden inflow of capital  (as was the case in 
Chile). 
49. In the United States, Section  8 of the Clayton  Act (1914)  prohibits  interlocking  director- 
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nies  that did not own  this firm before  (the holding  companies  resemble 
"privatization companies"  if this fraction is equal to 100%).5? 
A holding  company's  total asset value after the auctions is the value of 
its  shares  in  the  firms,  plus  the  proceeds  of the  sales  of shares  of the 
firms they  used  to own,  minus  the  cost  of purchase  of shares  of firms 
that belonged  to other holding  companies.  The auctions  have  thus  cre- 
ated an initial value for both the firms and the holding companies,  which 
will enable other economic  agents  to enter (or exit) the stock market in a 
less uncertain  situation  for stock prices. 
4. Market  period 
1.  Immediately  after the inception  period the markets for the firms' and 
the holding  companies'  stocks  are open  to all: citizens  (who  can sell 
their shares  of holding  companies  and buy  shares of firms), foreign- 
ers (up  to government  restrictions),  holding  companies  (up to laws 
on mergers and interlocking  directorates enforced by the merger com- 
mission),  and  other participants.  The holding  companies'  assets  are 
thus now  liquid. 
2.  The  government  and  the  (nonequity  holding)  foreigners  lose  their 
voting  rights in the boards of directors of the holding  companies. 
3.  Firms can issue  equity  and bonds  and can borrow from (newly  cre- 
ated) domestic  banks. 
4.  The managers  of firms and holding  companies  are presumably put on 
incentive  schemes  that  are  more  powerful  than  those  during  the 
noisy  phase. 
5.  Trade  liberalization  is  completed  according  to  the  predetermined 
timetable. 
6.  Regulated  firms are given  more innovative  and more powerful  incen- 
tive schemes  than cost-of-service  regulation  ("incentive regulation"). 
APPENDIX  2: DISCUSSION  OF THE  INCENTIVES  IN 
THE  SCENARIO 
1. Incentives  of  firms 
The prescription of very low-powered  incentive  schemes  for managers of 
firms reflects the absence of a stock market as well as the large uncertainty 
50. Setting aside a fraction  for other holding companies is similar  to a secondary  public 
offering  by a private  company  that looks to sell some of its existing  shares.  The remain- 
ing fraction  gives rise to an auction  in which the previous owner participates. 254 *  TIROLE 
about profits. Close monitoring  by the holding  companies  is important at 
this stage. We would  also expect managerial career concerns to play a role: 
During the noisy  stage,  there is much to be learned about managers both 
because  managers  lack experience  running  profit-oriented  units and be- 
cause  previous  education  is often  unrelated  to (and therefore  is a poor 
predictor of the ability in) the job. The labor market is thus likely to pay 
close attention  to the managers'  behavior,  which  gives  managers incen- 
tives to try to fool the labor market by working hard. This career concern, 
however,  will  be  operative  only  under  two  conditions:  first, managers 
should be able to move easily to other jobs; second,  the labor market must 
be able to differentiate  the roles of exogenous  shocks and of managerial 
contribution  in determining  managerial performance. 
The prescription  of giving  more bonuses  and  stock options  after the 
inception  phase reflects the ideas that there is then less exogenous  uncer- 
tainty and that the firm's stock market supplies  a measure of the value of 
assets. 
2. Incentives  in holding  companies 
Managers  of holding  companies  can be given  stronger monetary  incen- 
tives  than  their  counterparts  in  the  firms they  control.  First, portfolio 
diversification  gets rid of some of the firm-specific noise.  Second,  the use 
of  relative  performance  evaluation  for  holding  companies  eliminates 
some  of the  aggregate  risk. Yet, the high  level  of noise  in the environ- 
ment limits the role of monetary  incentives.  Monitoring by, in particular, 
foreign institutions  and (possibly  independent)  government  representa- 
tives  may  therefore  be  quite  important.  Last,  we  would  expect  career 
concerns  also to play some  role in the noisy  phase. 
The reduction of noise in the mature phase allows even stronger mone- 
tary incentives  and reduces  the desirability of monitoring by the board of 
directors. It thus  seems  logical to phase  out the former form of monitor- 
ing (attached to the absence  of a market for shares of the holding  compa- 
nies).  (Because  the value  of the holding  companies  can be continuously 
assessed  by looking  at the stock value  of their shares in firms, monitor- 
ing by big shareholders  or financial regulation seems  less important than 
for firms or banks,  respectively.) 
3. Regulatory  incentive  schemes 
Cost-of-service  regulation  has  many  unattractive  features.  Prominent 
among  them  is  the  firm's  low  incentive  to  reduce  current  cost  or to 
introduce  (nonmonetary)  innovations.  The firm benefits  from the  cost 
reduction  for a short  period  until  the  next  regulatory  review,  at which 
point the price is adjusted  downward  to reflect lower costs.  Similarly the Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  * 255 
firm enjoys  the benefits  of an innovation  only  until the next regulatory 
review.  This problem  will be particularly serious in the EE environment: 
The  many  adjustments  taking  place  in  the  economy  (including  input 
prices) require frequent  price reviews  for the regulated  firm, which  cre- 
ates low incentives  for cost reduction  and innovation. 
Cost-of-service  regulation,  the  predominant  mode  of  regulation  in 
many  countries  until  the  1980s,  has  been  rightly  decried,  and  more 
powerful  incentive  schemes  (profit sharing provisions,  price caps) have 
been  introduced  in  some  industries,  in particular in  the  United  States 
and the United  Kingdom.  Despite  favoring incentive  regulation  in gen- 
eral, we would  be reluctant to recommend  its adoption  during the noisy 
phase  in EE. As discussed  earlier, both the high level of uncertainty and 
the  strong  threat  of  regulatory  capture  call for low-powered  incentive 
schemes  such  as cost-of-service  regulation.  Only  when  the uncertainty 
has been  somewhat  resolved  and  safeguards  have been  put in place to 
prevent  capture can incentive  regulation be introduced. 
4. Incentives  and  auctions 
The design  of the inception  stage must reflect several goals as discussed 
in Section 5; in particular, it must give the firm's owner during the noisy 
phase  an  incentive  to  invest;  it must  also  give  holding  companies  an 
incentive  to collect information  about the firms they will bid on,  so as to 
create  a  relatively  accurate  measure  of  asset  values  at  the  inception 
stage.  The  firm  will  have  some  incentive  to  invest  if  its  owner  (the 
holding  company)  receives  the  proceeds  of  its  auction  and  carefully 
monitors the firm. Managers of the firm will also be induced  to invest by 
the  nonstationarity  of  their incentive  scheme:  the  low-powered  incen- 
tives in the noisy  phase  reduce  the cost of investment  borne by manag- 
ers,  while  the  higher  powered  incentives  in  the  mature  phase  allows 
them to benefit  from these  investments. 
Earmarking shares  on which  the firm's owner  is not allowed  to bid is 
one simple  way  of creating liquidity in the stock market. The motivation 
was  developed  in Section  5.  Its main purpose  is not to create liquidity 
per se, but to give  investors  incentives  to acquire information about the 
value  of firms.51  Forcing a firm to divest  some  of its shares eliminates  to 
some  extent  the  lemons  problem  associated  with  the voluntary  sale or 
issue  of shares.52 
51. A concern  is that the large number  of auctions  might induce the holding companies  to 
rig bids. There  are, however, some safeguards.  First,  the seller is not an outside seller 
such as the government, but one of the holding companies. Second, foreigners  might 
be used as "potential  entrants"  to break  collusion. 
52. See Akerlof (1970)  for the general issue, and Myers and Majluf  (1984)  for the applica- 
tion to corporate  financing. See also the discussion in Section  5. 256 *  TIROLE 
APPENDIX  3: COMPARISON  WITH  GROWTH 
COMPANIES 
Comparing  the  governance  structure  within  the  holding  company  to 
known  governance  structures  helps  clarify  its  nature.  This  appendix 
points  at some  analogies  and differences  with growth companies. 
A firm controlled  by a holding  during  the noisy  phase  and a growth 
company  financed  by venture  capital both face very risky environments. 
They will not be traded on the stock market until a substantial fraction of 
the  uncertainty  about  the  technological  and  demand  environment  is 
resolved.  In the meantime  a major investor  holds  a substantial  amount 
of  equity  in  the  firm: the  holding  in  the  first case,  a  venture  capital 
partnership,  a wealthy  individual,  or an investment  institution  in  the 
second  case. This investor  carefully monitors and exerts control over the 
firm.53  The investor  supplies  substantial advice to inexperienced  manag- 
ers of the firm. He gives  the money  in several steps in order to be able to 
shut down  the firm if necessary. Debt, which is very risky in this environ- 
ment,  plays a very minor role. In both cases,  the rewards of the investor 
and the firm are delayed; and so is the public offering and the opening  of 
the firm to new  investors.54 
Besides  these  many  similarities,  there  is  an  essential  difference  be- 
tween  a subsidiary  of a holding  and a growth  company:  The incentives 
of the investor's  and the firm's managers  are low-powered  in the case of 
a holding  company.  The fact that the managers  of the holding  company 
face  low-powered  incentives  (some  stocks,  but  mainly  relative  perfor- 
mance  evaluation,  monitoring,  and career concerns)  makes the holding 
resemble  the  investment  division  of  a financial  institution  more  than 
venture  capitalists  or wealthy  individuals.  More importantly, the firm's 
managers  face very low-powered  incentives  (mainly monitoring  and ca- 
reer  concerns)  while  the  founders  of  a  growth  company  face  high- 
powered  incentives  (at the beginning  of the relationship  they may hold 
half of the stock of the company).  The explanation  for this discrepancy is 
not  due  to  differences  in  the  marginal  productivity  of  effort; in  both 
cases,  managerial  input  is quite  crucial to the  growth  of the firm. Two 
53. According  to Brealey and Myers (1988, p. 326), venture  capital investors  do not neces- 
sarily demand  a majority on  the board of directors.  A common  compromise  gives  an 
equal  number  of seats  to the  founders  and to outside  investors.  Coutarelli (1977, pp. 
18, 110) observes  that the European venture  capitalist does  not seek a majority interest 
in the investee,  but that they still exert substantial control (often,  the venture  capitalist 
becomes  a majority shareholder  by supplying  further funds  to the venture  anyway). 
54. Of  course,  some  successful  firms  do  not  go  public  (examples  include  investment- 
banking firms such as Goldman,  Sachs & Co., construction  and engineering  firms such 
as Bechtel, or stereo manufacturer Bose). These firms either are not capital intensive  or 
else finance new  investments  through  retained earnings  and secured bank lines. Privatization  in Eastern  Europe  * 257 
other factors seem  to generate  the discrepancy.  First, the founders  of a 
growth  firm usually  can  finance  a nonnegligible  fraction  of  initial  ex- 
penses  through  savings  and personal bank loans. In contrast, the manag- 
ers of big privatized  EE firms cannot  purchase  a substantial  fraction of 
their firm's capital; nor can they use  leverage  in this very risky environ- 
ment.  This means  that  they  will  own  a much  smaller fraction of their 
firm than  their  counterparts  in  the  growth  firm.  Second,  it is  hard to 
make the firm's managers  accountable  for the value  of its assets  during 
the noisy  phase  in EE. Because  of the current idiosyncratic  structure of 
production,  firms will need  to be broken into pieces and reorganized.  In 
the  absence  of  meaningful  transfer  prices  for  assets,  it  is  difficult  to 
identify  the  managers'  individual  contributions.  In contrast,  managers 
of a growth company  are in charge of a well-defined  and stable property. 
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ALAN GELB 
CECSE,  World  Bank 
How  does  this paper fit into a macroeconomic  conference?  I asked,  and 
was  told  that  macro  is  whatever  the  organizers  work  on  or consider 
important.  Hopefully  these  categories  have  a large overlap! But the pa- 
per does  indeed  address  a central area in the debate on the privatization 
of  socialist  countries-the  trade-offs  between  equity,  speed,  and  effi- 
ciency and the link to the last via corporate governance  structures. Hold- 
ing  companies  are  sometimes  proposed  to  focus  the  power  of  small 
owners  and so to impose  "people's  capitalism." The paper goes further, 
to consider  the incentive  structures for enterprise managers and holding 
company  managers,  and relates these  to the stage of reform. 
Are holding  companies  a good  idea at all? We could spend  a long time 
discussing  the paper in the broader context of privatization,  but I prefer 
to recognize  its high  degree  of focus and abstraction as its strength,  and 
to comment  within  its own  reference framework. 
As  a general  point,  transition  paths  do have  longer-term  effects  on 
governance  structures,  through  political-economic  hysteresis  effects. 
One example now evident  is the difficulty of abolishing self-management, 
which emerged  in the aftermath of the power vacuum caused by relaxing 
central control before resolving  the ownership  issue. 
The paper has some  excellent  insights.  I especially  liked the character- 
ization of the transition into a noisy  (3-10 years?) and a quiet period, and 
the  parallel  with  growth  companies  and  the  venture  capital industry. 
This  also  suggests  that in  the  phase  of reorganization  we  may  not  be 
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looking  for  conventional  "managers,"  but  for  reorganizers  or  turn- 
around specialists. 
Out of these  insights  the paper derives  some  conclusions  that I think 
are right: 
1.  Stock markets work poorly  in the noisy  phase; 
2.  Gradualism in the introduction  of such markets; 
3.  Political credibility  as an obstacle  to very  high-powered  schemes  in 
noisy  environments; 
4.  Low-powered  incentives  for regulated  industries  (here I agree  only 
partly in that the firms must be allowed  to pass on larger input price 
shocks); and 
5.  Competition-enhancing  restructuring  prior to privatization  (but this 
should  be evaluated  in an open  economy,  not just national,  context). 
However,  I would  not  have  derived  some  other  conclusions  of  the 
paper. First, we must be clear on the roles of the two types of managers. 
There are two cases: 
1.  The holding  has a wide  and diverse group of firms with little obvious 
synergy  (for diversification  of its portfolio).  The presumption  then is 
that the  firm's manager  (the  "insider") has  superior  information  on 
its activities and potential.  The holding  should not cross-subsidize  via 
transfer  pricing,  etc.  The  governance  problem  is  the  conventional 
one. 
2.  Some  reorganization  may  require  a  "sector" approach  that  will  be 
inhibited  if  the  firms  in  that  sector  are  dispersed  across  different 
holdings.  So we might have a "sector holding" (say steel) as a reorga- 
nizational  device.  As  the  holding  intervenes  in  its  firms  with  a 
broader view,  managers  of the firm cannot be held finally accountable 
as in case (1). They could conceivably  receive shares in the sector but 
not in that firm. 
Let us put case (2) on one side and focus on case (1). The paper argues 
for low-power  incentives  in the  noisy  phase,  because  of the  impact  of 
noise on a structure of rewards based on stock market valuations.  True, a 
noisy  market will  not  reflect management  quality and effort efficiently. 
But high  noise  will  weaken  all forms  of  management  evaluation  and 
oversight  because  we  can never  know  the characteristics of all states of 
the world well enough  to separate out the management  inputs.  Consider 
career  concerns.  There  will  be  plenty  of  real  or  spurious  exogenous Comment 261 
shocks on which  to blame failure-how  do we tell the difference? Moni- 
toring? If this  were  really  possible,  why  consider  incentives  at all? In 
particular, this paper does  not note  the key trade-offs between  monitor- 
ing capability and portfolio  diversification. 
I would  formulate  an  alternative  proposition:  high noise means large 
management  discretion. It is  then  even  more  vital  to  seek  out  and  offer 
high-powered  incentives.  But these  must be designed  to minimally  dis- 
tort decision  making-again  because  of  the  weakness  of  monitoring. 
This argues  against  bonuses  based  on  short-term  performance,  and  in 
favor of deferred,  but possibly  substantial,  compensation,  say, through 
stock options  to be exercised  at the end of the noisy  phase. 
In  this  connection,  the  paper  overemphasizes  the  need  for  liquid 
stock  markets  to  value  assets.  Few  countries  have  such  markets,  and 
they  cover  only  part of  corporate  assets  at best.  But firms are bought 
and  sold  all the  time  so  assets  are being  valued.  Extreme noise,  rather 
than  the  absence  of  a liquid  market,  is  the  main  current  problem  in 
valuing  assets  in East Europe.  Therefore,  it is not out of the question  to 
consider  high-power  incentives  that are deferred  for some  3-10  years. 
If the managers  are foreign,  these  can be structured so as to reduce the 
impact  on  long-term  ownership  patterns-for  example,  by  offering 
shares of the company  that must be sold out to domestic  bidders over a 
number  of  subsequent  years.  Such  arrangements  have  been  used  in 
some  developing  countries  to  encourage  direct investment  and  at the 
same time to reduce fears of loss of national sovereignty.  Another exam- 
ple is the French  "core group"  approach,  where  a stable core is locked 
in  to  provide  continuous  management  in  the  transition  and  some 
shares  are later offered  to  small  investors  at a discount,  reflecting  the 
better control and information  position  of the management  group. 
The venture  capital industry  is a good analogy. It works on the basis of 
pervasive  high-powered  and deferred incentives,  to managers and those 
monitoring.  Neither  of the  reasons  given  as to why  the East European 
case is different  is persuasive:  (1) Whether  or not they  have invested  is 
irrelevant in considering  incentives  for the firm and fund managers; you 
want  them  to behave  as if they had; and (2) the difficulty of other forms 
of  monitoring  in  the  noisy  phase  is  downplayed.  Note  too  that high- 
powered  incentives  may help to self-select  out candidates  from the pool 
of  potential  managers,  if  individuals  appreciate  their  own  potential 
managerial skills better than those  selecting  them. 
The suggestion  that foreign funds be used  for loans rather than equity 
investments  runs  up  against  the  problem  of  nonbankable  risk (rising 
interest rates leading  to deteriorating portfolios because of adverse selec- 
tion  of borrowers  and  moral hazard).  Lending  to the  holdings  instead 262 *  VISHNY 
confronts  their  monitoring  problem,  referred  to  above.  This  is  not  an 
easy out. 
Regulatory  capture is a problem.  But it is possibly  serious whether  or 
not incentives  are high powered,  because  the rents generated by capture 
can be appropriated  by employees  as well. 
Finally-noise  implies  rents.  I see  no way  to sustain  ex post  equality 
and at the same time to establish  incentive  structures needed  for the task 
ahead.  Hopefully,  we  shall  see  some  interesting  experiments  in  East 
Europe  soon,  to  enable  us  to  better  assess  the  various  trade-offs  and 
options  that are the subject of this paper. 
Comment 
ROBERT  W. VISHNY 
Graduate  School of Business, University  of Chicago  and NBER 
I would  like  to  preface  my  remarks  by  thanking  Robert Hamada,  Ed 
Lazear, and Michael Mussa  from the Graduate School of Business,  Uni- 
versity  of Chicago  for helpful  discussions  on privatization  surrounding 
our recent visit to Czechoslovakia.  I learned a lot about privatization  on 
that trip. 
While it is hard to come up with something  completely  new  on a topic 
as widely  discussed  as privatization  in Eastern Europe, Jean Tirole has 
managed  to make  a nice  contribution  to that growing  literature. His is 
mostly  a synthesis  paper  with  careful justifications  and  arguments  of- 
fered for and against many popular policy prescriptions.  But there is also 
a slightly different emphasis  here: he discusses  not only how to structure 
the ownership  and incentives  in existing  "enterprises," but also how  to 
restructure the enterprises  themselves  before privatization.  I think that 
this is a very  important  problem  that is too often  overlooked  in papers 
on privatization. 
Tirole is principally concerned  with the problem of promoting competi- 
tive  behavior  since  many  state  enterprises  are monopoly  providers  of 
goods  and  services.  While  new  firms would  presumably  be allowed  to 
form and  compete  with  privatized  former state enterprises,  one  could 
provide  even  more  effective  competition  in many  cases by breaking up 
existing  state monopolies  and  dividing  up  their assets  and employees. 
In general,  governments  such as Czechoslovakia's  are grappling  with 
the  problem  of  how  to  evaluate  competing  proposals  for privatization 
and  deciding  whether  a given  enterprise's  assets  will be completely  or 
partially sold  to foreigners,  become  part of a joint venture,  split up into 
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separate entities  based  on geography  or product lines,  or else privatized 
as is. These  decisions  seem  to be taking place on a case by case basis and 
could  be  helped  considerably  by  a  set  of  consistent  guidelines  and  a 
requirement  that the state conduct  a competition  among various propos- 
als for privatizing  a particular enterprise  rather than just allowing  each 
enterprise's  current top management  to draw up the only plan. 
I endorse  Tirole's  emphasis  on  restructuring  existing  enterprises  be- 
fore privatization.  I would  even  extend  the point to say that the govern- 
ments  should  also consider breaking up certain large conglomerates  that 
operate  in many  disparate  businesses.  First, in many  cases,  a potential 
business  partner will be interested  in only  a part of the enterprise.  Sec- 
ond,  I think  the  potential  for cross-subsidization  of unprofitable  busi- 
nesses  even  after privatization  is great, which makes a division  of a large 
conglomerate  less  subject to the  discipline  of a hard budget  constraint. 
When incumbent  management  stays on to run the enterprise the risk of 
this cross-subsidization  and commitment  to marginal businesses  will be 
even  greater. Of course,  on the other side of the coin we have the value 
of an internal  capital market provided  by a conglomerate  structure at a 
time  when  external  capital  markets  may  not  be  operating  very  well. 
Third, the U.S.  experience  appears  to show  that conglomerates  are not 
the most efficient way to organize.  While the EE private sector may come 
to realize this and force changes  in organizations  over time, it may make 
sense  to  bias  the  starting  conditions  for those  economies  in  the  right 
direction.  Finally,  even  when  highly  diversified  enterprises  are priva- 
tized as is, it will be important  to set in place an accounting  system  that 
treats each  business  as a separate  profit center rather than obscure  the 
cross-subsidization  that is going  on via transfer pricing. 
My  main  reservation  about  this  paper  is  that it overemphasizes  the 
importance  of uncertainty  over the pricing of assets.  Distrust of market 
prices for individual  assets is one of the reasons for the holding company 
structure  as  well  as  the  prescription  for  low  powered  incentives  for 
managers of firms. I agree with Tirole that the pricing of these assets will 
be  subject  to great uncertainty  and  that there may be big winners  and 
losers  ex post  if assets  are simply  sold  off. But one  must  be aware that 
trying to ensure  ex post fairness to all parties may come at a high cost in 
terms of economic  growth  and efficiency. 
For example,  I think  it is essential  to encourage  the inflow  of capital 
and  expertise  from abroad as  soon  as possible  if current consumption 
standards are to be maintained  and essential  infrastructure is built. This 
may  not be facilitated  by the  holding  company  structure.  It may make 
more sense  to sell off certain assets  to foreigners  or domestics  from the 
beginning  so that they  can start investing  immediately.  It would  proba- 264 *  VISHNY 
bly  be  a mistake  to  wait  5  or  10 years  until  market values  are better 
established  to  start  selling  assets.  It  seems  unlikely  that  people  will 
invest when  property rights are not well established.  I know that foreign 
investors  in joint  ventures  often  demand  assurances  about  the  gover- 
nance structure and the board of directors that may not be feasible under 
the envisioned  holding  company  structure. 
I am also  concerned  that the  envisioned  holding  company  structure 
moves  too far away from the concept of creating concentrated ownership 
interests in individual  enterprises  and minimizing  the role of politics and 
government  in  business  decision  making.  I understand  most  of these 
proposals  as specifying  a small number of holding  companies  that would 
own  and run the economy,  say 10 or 20. There seem  to be several prob- 
lems with this. First, if we think about 1500 large enterprises after restruc- 
turing and privatization,  how  are 10-20  holding  company  boards going 
to have the time and incentive  to monitor 75-150  firms each? The benefit 
of having  individual  firms each with its own  set of large shareholders  to 
monitor  the  management  would  be  substantially  diminished.  Second, 
with  10 or 20 holding  companies,  each  holding  substantial  portions  or 
large numbers  of firms,  I keep  thinking  that these  holding  companies 
look a lot like government  ministries  and would  probably be subject to 
the same political pressures  as a government  running  the economy.  For 
example,  these  holding  companies  would  probably be vulnerable  to co- 
ordinated  strikes for higher wages  by workers in all of their enterprises. 
In addition,  members  of the board of directors of one  of those  holding 
companies  would  have  tremendous  power  and there would  seem  to be 
huge  scope  for graft. The answer  to this latter problem is public account- 
ability through  the voting  mechanism,  but this seems  likely to politicize 
the holding  companies  as I argued before. 
The answer  to all these  problems  would  seem  to be creating a larger 
number  of  separate  firms,  each  with  its  own  concentrated  ownership 
structure  in  order  to  provide  for  the  proper  incentives.  The  holding 
company  structure  may  be more  appropriate  for the very  largest firms 
(that is, a fraction of the 500-1500  largest firms), but in order to provide 
incentives  to all but  the  very  largest  firms,  I would  think  that concen- 
trated direct shareholdings  in the firm would  be desirable. These would 
include  ownership  by management  as well as by domestics  or foreigners 
(individuals  or institutions)  who  buy equity  stakes in the firms. Clearly, 
when  it comes  to small  scale privatization,  most  people  have  no objec- 
tions to simply  selling  them off, and everyone  agrees that this is the best 
way  to  ensure  that  someone  takes  an active  interest  in improving  the 
performance  of those  assets.  I think that the same principles  should  be Comment  265 
applied  to the large  scale privatization,  especially  at the smaller end  of 
the 1500 largest enterprises. 
Tirole's objection  to providing  managers  high  powered  incentives  in 
the form of equity  stakes is that there is too much uncertainty  about the 
ultimate value of the firm's equity during the "noisy" period. I agree that 
values will be extremely  uncertain for awhile,  but I do not think that this 
should  stand in the way of providing  managers with incentives  or allow- 
ing individuals  or institutions  to buy large pieces  of firms and establish 
property  rights.  If the  risk to  management  is large  due  to  fluctuating 
values,  then be a little more generous  and give the management  a reason- 
able  fixed  salary  as  well  as  good  upside  potential  via  stock  or  stock 
options.  If there is a question  about managers using their inside informa- 
tion to trade,  then  simply  give  them restricted stock (which  is common 
in  the  United  States)  that  cannot  be  sold  for 5 or 7 years.  Out  of  the 
money  options  could  be used  to ensure  that managers  are not too risk 
averse because  of their contingent  compensation. 
As far as outside  investors  are concerned,  there is no doubt that allow- 
ing assets  to trade before  values  are well-established  will create ex post 
winners  and losers,  but I think this may be necessary  to establish prop- 
erty rights  and  encourage  investment  as  everyone  agrees  is  the  right 
policy for the small-scale  privatization.  I am also a little more optimistic 
about  the  ability  of individuals  and  institutions  to accumulate  concen- 
trated  stakes  in  individual  firms.  Apart  from foreigners  who  must  be 
encouraged  because  of tremendous  capital needs,  domestics  should  also 
be able to accumulate concentrated  stakes. First, in some countries gener- 
ous  restitution  programs  will  create  large  pockets  of  wealth.  Second, 
individuals  should  be  able to pool  their "voucher  points"  via financial 
institutions  that will invest  on their behalf and take large stakes in indi- 
vidual enterprises.  The government  could even encourage  these institu- 
tions  to hold  large stakes  in individual  enterprises,  by imposing  lower 
taxes on dividends  from such holdings. 
Finally, while  the  problem  of  providing  incentives  to managers  and 
monitoring  by outside  shareholders  is important,  it may be even  more 
important  to ensure  a rapid inflow  of expertise  and capital into Eastern 
Europe.  Moreover,  capital  and  expertise  at the  World Bank, IMF, and 
EBRD are limited,  so we  must  look to investment  by foreigners  in indi- 
vidual  enterprises  as an important  source  of capital and expertise.  This 
can take place via joint ventures  or outright sale of existing state assets to 
foreigners.  While  joint  ventures  may  be  more  palatable  politically,  it 
should  be  recognized  that  they  still require some  kind  of valuation  of 
existing assets  that determines  the capital contribution the outsider must 266 *  DISCUSSION 
make in exchange for his share of the profits/revenues, etc. Outside 
investment cannot be encouraged without some kind of claim to cash 
flows and decision rights. This will entail effectively selling assets when 
their value is highly uncertain and also agreeing to governance struc- 
tures that may be incompatible with the envisioned holding company 
structure. 
Discussion 
Sweder van Wijnbergen  suggested that dissolving the holding compa- 
nies may prove to be difficult. For example, in 1945 Italy created ENI, 
which by law would be dissolved in 5 years. Instead, it is now the largest 
industrial conglomerate. He also offered that attracting  foreign invest- 
ment will be costly. High temporary  uncertainty  means the option value 
of investment is high, leading to delay. 
Robert  Barro  objected to the notion that there is necessarily  an equity- 
efficiency  trade-off.  Formerly,  in Eastern  Europe  the distribution  of politi- 
cal perks, which should be measured as part of personal wealth, was 
very uneven. He also wondered why the role of stock markets  should be 
minimized in the beginning. Sorting through noise is what stock mar- 
kets are designed to do. Moreover, property rights will be distributed 
rather arbitrarily,  and therefore it seems important to allow people to 
trade their claims. Tirole answered that the stock market  will not mea- 
sure  manager performance well  in  the  noisy  phase,  and  incentive 
schemes will not work well. One will have to provide monitoring, and 
traditionally  stock markets  have played a minor role in monitoring. 
Robert  Gordon asked whether an important  element of foreign  invest- 
ment was expertise. Was General  Electric's  experience  in Hungary typi- 
cal? Tirole noted expertise can be rented; it need not come only in the 
form of ownership. Julio Rotemberg pointed out that foreign involve- 
ment may cause problems in that foreign investors may just acquire 
assets cheaply. In addition, comparing  Hong Kong, Taiwan,  and Singa- 
pore, Singapore used more foreign firms, but Hong Kong and Taiwan 
seem to have fostered higher total productivity  growth. Work  by Michael 
Cusumano shows  that Toyota used much less foreign expertise than 
Nissan but had more technological  progress. Paul  Romer  suggested that 
the discussion of incentives and inefficiencies  can be thought of as lying 
in a wrong place in the production  possibility  frontier.  The discussion on 
foreign expertise can be thought of as shifts in the frontier.  This latter 
model should be given as much emphasis. 
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Paul Marer questioned  the assumption  that ownership  claims will be 
distributed more or less free to the population.  He stated that East Euro- 
pean  governments  and  central  banks  have  large  liabilities,  nonper- 
forming  debts  of the banking  system,  large foreign debts,  and environ- 
mental legacies.  The governments  are counting  on the income generated 
by the sale of properties  and enterprises  to finance these liabilities. Rob- 
ert Gordon  indicated  that restitution  to former owners  of assets  is an- 
other distributional  issue. 
Alan  Gelb noted  that an important  element  lost in the discussion  of 
traded  goods  is  the  disastrous  state  of  services.  Telecommunications, 
information  processing,  accounting,  and financial services are all impor- 
tant elements  of a competitive  manufacturing  base. These industries will 
need  to improve. 